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Truth, and goodness, and beauty, are but different faces of 
the same All.  
Ralph Waldo Emerson1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A law school education is one of the finest learning 
experiences American education has to offer.2  This well-deserved 
reputation derives significantly from the Socratic method of 
instruction, whereby a series of detailed questions are used to 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific McGeorge School 
of Law.  I wish to express my gratitude to the members of Pacific McGeorge’s 
2013–14 Curriculum Committee, on which I served, for the deeply enriching 
experience of discussing law school curriculum reform in the robust and 
thoughtful way that has helped to shape the ideas expressed in this Article.  These 
members include Professors Raquel Aldana, Julie Davies, Leslie Jacobs, Jeffrey 
Proske, and Brian Slocum, Associate Dean Dorothy Landsberg, and student 
members, Stephen Hallett and Michelle Scheinman.  Thanks also go to the 
unflappable Neil Cacali for his diligent research assistance.  Special thanks go to 
Professor Jeffrey Proske for his helpful comments to an early draft of this Article.  
Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Jean M. Shanley, Esq., for her support, 
encouragement, and comments through the writing of this Article.  
1. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nature, in NATURE; ADDRESSES AND LECTURES 
30 (New & Rev. ed., 1898). 
2. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION 
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 186 (2007) (stating that “[f]rom . . . [a] comparative 
perspective, law schools are impressive educational institutions”). The Carnegie 
Report was published in a book by its authors.  Id.  
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challenge the student in an inherently competitive environment 
among his or her colleagues in an effort to hone his or her analytical 
reasoning skills.3  Law students benefit from this method, and it is 
generally understood that “by the end of their first year, most have 
developed a clear ability to reason and argue in ways distinctive to 
the American legal profession.”4  The Socratic method, sometimes 
referred to as the “case dialogue” method and deemed the “signature 
pedagogy” of law school, was first introduced into American legal 
education at Harvard Law School in the 1870s by Dean Christopher 
Columbus Langdell and still predominates at law schools today.5 
It was a wise move on Dean Langdell’s part to take guidance 
from the ancient Greeks to bring intellectual rigor to legal education.  
The Socratic method, of course, is attributed to the ancient Greek 
philosopher Socrates, whose teachings were described in the works 
of his student, Plato.6  Clearly, the Socratic method places a high 
priority on cultivating a sharp and rational mind.7  In comparing the 
Athenian philosophy to other cultures, Plato observed that “the 
special characteristic of our part of the world is the love of 
knowledge.”8  The Greeks were absolutely delighted by thoughts and 
ideas, treasuring them as “the fair and immortal children of the 
mind.”9  Edith Hamilton, one of the twentieth century’s most revered 
Greek scholars, says of Ancient Greece, “never, not even in the 
brightest days of the Renaissance, has learning appeared in such a 
radiant light . . . .”10  Because the practice of law involves so much 
analytical thinking and reasoning ability, it has strengthened the 
profession immensely for law schools to embrace this aspect of the 
Greek approach to learning.  As a result, today we have a high 
3. Id. at 2.  The “question-and-answer format” is to help students to analyze 
“ordinary human conflicts into the distinctive ‘frame’ defined by legal points of 
reference and the requirements of legal doctrine.”  Id. at 53. 
4. Id.  
5. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 50–53; Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong 
with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 615 
(2007). 
6. THOMAS R. MARTIN, ANCIENT GREECE 84−85 (1996). 
7. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 52–53. 
8. EDITH HAMILTON, THE GREEK WAY 30 (1993). 
9. Id. at 30. 
10. Id.  
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caliber community of legal professionals populated with many elite 
thinkers. 
It should not be overlooked, however, that the ancient Greeks’ 
intellectual approach to life was by no means limited to rationality of 
thought.  They also embraced less rationality-driven concepts such as 
beauty, feeling, intuitive knowledge, inspiration, sense of goodness, 
and sense of balance. 11   Hamilton explains this concept in her 
observation that, in ancient Greeks, “[g]reat mind and great spirit 
combined.”12  The ideal human life to the ancient Greeks was one 
lived in pursuit of not only objective understanding and knowledge 
through rational thought, but also “just action” and “the subjective 
experience of beauty.”13  Collectively, these life goals are commonly 
referred to as “the true, the good and the beautiful.”14  Hamilton 
explains this concept most eloquently: 
Plato is speaking as a typical Greek when he says that 
there are men who have an intuitive insight, an 
inspiration, which causes them to do good and 
beautiful things.  They themselves do not know why 
they do as they do, and therefore they are unable to 
explain to others.  It is so with poets and, in a sense, 
with all good men.  But if one could be found who 
11. Id.  
12. Id. at 31.  Hamilton further distinguishes the philosophies of ancient India 
and Egypt, which emphasized spirituality.  She states:  
 
The Egyptian way and the way of the East had led through 
suffering and by the abnegation of the intellect to the supremacy 
of the spirit.  That goal the Greeks could never come in sight 
of . . . . What marked the Greeks off from Egypt and India was 
not an inferior degree of spirituality but a superior degree of 
mentality . . . . The spiritual world was not to them another 
world from the natural world.  It was the same world as that 
known to the mind.  Beauty and rationality were both manifested 
in it.  They did not see the conclusions reached by the spirit and 
those reached by the mind as opposed to each other.  Reason and 
feeling were not antagonistic. 
 
Id.     
13. WILLIAM ISAACS, DIALOGUE AND THE ART OF THINKING TOGETHER 13 
(1999). 
14. Id.  
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was able to add to his instinct for the right or the 
beautiful, a clear idea of the reason for its rightness or 
beauty, he would be among men what a living man 
would be in the dead world of flitting shades.15 
Thus, the truly fulfilling and complete intellectual experience or 
education, to the ancient Greeks, was one in which there was a 
balance among truth, goodness, and beauty.   
I believe that law schools would, once again, benefit from 
looking to Ancient Greece for guidance to improve the educational 
experience of their students and to better prepare them for the 
twenty-first century.  The ancient Greeks, more than any other 
civilization before or since, understood the limits of rationality in 
personal and professional life and strove to balance rational thought 
with goodness and beauty—forms of knowledge equally important to 
them.16  By evaluating law schools’ required core curricula in light 
of the Greek concepts of the true, the good, and the beautiful, we can 
identify a number of deficient areas, the most serious of which are 
further discussed in this Article.  If we modify the core curricula to 
embrace these concepts, as the ancient Greeks did, law schools can 
create lawyers who more closely reflect the Greek ideal.  They will 
be more skilled at balancing adversarial advocacy with wise counsel, 
good judgment, and creative problem solving.  They will learn to 
lawyer more “holistically.” 
This concept of understanding the “whole” was paramount 
for the ancient Greeks.  They appreciated that a truly beautiful world 
was one that exhibited balance, order, and organized relationships.17  
In all of their endeavors, whether it was poetry, art, architecture, or 
philosophical studies, they considered the end result in a holistic 
light—“system, order, connection, they were impelled to seek for.”18  
For example, the Greeks took great care in the design and placement 
of their temples so that they became part of the landscape, situated to 
15. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 30. 
16. See id. at 31 (noting that the Greeks considered both beauty and 
rationality to be combined and “[t]hey did not see the conclusions reached by the 
spirit and those reached by the mind as opposed to each other”). 
17. See id. at 184–85 (discussing the “necessity of the Greek mind to see 
everything in relation to a whole”). 
18. Id. at 29.  “Greeks always saw things as parts of a whole, and this habit of 
mind is stamped upon everything they did.”  Id. at 184. 
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create the best effect “in relation to the hills and the seas and the arch 
of the sky.” 19  Contrast this sensibility to those architects of the 
Middle Ages who placed many of the great cathedrals where it was 
convenient, amid the small village houses, standing as majestic 
monumental incongruities upon the landscape.20  The ancient Greeks, 
however, saw everything in relation to the whole.  As Hamilton 
states, “[t]hey saw what was permanently important in a man and 
unites him to the rest.”21  The Greeks saw an object in the world “in 
all its pertinent relationships,” which defines true wisdom.22   
If lawyers are to be good and valuable counselors, they need 
to be prepared to see legal issues and legal disputes from many 
perspectives in the context of all their relevant relationships—in the 
holistic thinking style of the ancient Greeks.  Historically, law 
schools’ required core curricula have generally overvalued lawyers 
as legal analysts and undervalued their roles as problem solvers.23  
What is needed is a sea change toward educating to create the more 
complete, or “holistic,” lawyer by cultivating not only the lawyer’s 
reasoning ability, but also the lawyer’s morality, creativity, 
professional identity, and general problem-solving skills.  With these 
additional capabilities, lawyers will be better prepared to counsel 
clients and creatively prevent, manage, and litigate disputes. 
Expanding lawyers’ perspective of clients’ needs and 
problems is more important than ever before to meet the demands of 
clients in the twenty-first century.  The changing economic 
environment has forced clients in all sectors to achieve results with 
greater efficiency. 24  Clients are seeking creative problem-solvers 
who can participate in a team environment and appreciate not only 
the client’s legal rights, but also their business and psychological 
needs.25  In such challenging times, holistic lawyering is not simply 
beneficial—it is increasingly required.26   
19. Id. at 185. 
20. Id. at 184. 
21. Id. at 205.   
22. WILL DURANT, What is Wisdom?, in WISDOM, NO. 8, 25–26 (1957). 
23. Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer 
as Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 918–19 (2000). 
24. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
YOUR FUTURE 4 (2013). 
25. See Michael T. Colatrella Jr., A “Lawyer for All Seasons”: The Lawyer 
as Conflict Manager, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 156 (2012) (discussing a need for 
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This Article explores a number of specific areas where the 
required core curricula of law schools should be modified and 
expanded to produce more holistic lawyers.  I examine this topic in 
light of the ancient Greek ideal of its citizens being educated in “the 
true, the good[,] and the beautiful.”  I propose three ways to bring 
greater balance to the law school curriculum, one concept for each of 
these three spheres of knowledge.   
First, law schools should enhance their core curricula by 
adding education in what I call “collaborative advocacy,” which is a 
form of scientific knowledge and skill that enables litigators to work 
effectively as advocates in collaborative processes like negotiation 
and mediation. 27   This would foster in students a more “true” 
understanding of the diverse skills required for lawyers beyond the 
“adversarial advocacy” strategies and tactics that currently 
predominate law school.  Second, law schools should teach “the 
good” by adding to their core curricula assistance in the moral 
development of their students.  Lawyers are frequently in a position 
of responsibility and power in relation to their clients that will test 
their commitment to their shared professional values—ethics—and 
their personal values—morals—in unique ways.  Law schools need 
to do more than teach the minimal ethical standards28—they also 
need to build character.  Third, law schools can foster “the beautiful” 
by increasing the role creative thinking has in their core curricula.  
Creative thinking and problem solving, while always valuable, will 
become indispensable skills for the twenty-first century lawyer.  As 
lawyers to transition to roles as conflict managers and problem-solvers rather than 
just legal advocates). 
26. See SUSAN SWAIM DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
173−74 (2004) (suggesting that “[p]ost-Enlightenment developments in 
philosophy, law, and legal practice” that incorporate psychology and emotional 
elements in legal practice should be synthesized into a movement). 
27. JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW LAWYER 109 (2008).  In her excellent 
book on the changing face of legal practice both in Canada and the United States, 
Professor Julie Macfarlane calls this “advocacy as conflict resolution.” 
28. Professional education must also include instruction in that profession’s 
core values.  SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 33.  The MacCrate Report found 
“fundamental values” of the profession that included the following: “striving to 
promote justice, fairness and morality.”  A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. AND PROF. 
DEV.—AN EDUC. CONTINUUM, A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE 
BAR 135–36 (1992). 
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more routine legal skills like discovery, research, and even 
brief-writing are increasingly done more cheaply and efficiently with 
the aid of computers and counsel in other countries, the ability for 
attorneys to provide value to their clients as the architects of new 
ideas and technologies, and as creative problem solvers, will take on 
paramount importance. 
With declining enrollment and increasing criticism of the 
wide gap between what lawyers need to know to be successful 
professionals and what law school has traditionally taught, law 
schools are well advised to rethink and recalibrate how they deliver 
legal education.  This Article, as a general rule, does not recommend 
specific courses, but rather addresses general topics that should in 
some way be incorporated into law schools’ required curricula 
because they are essential to the practice of law in the twenty-first 
century.  Like the ancient Greeks, who identified the core values of 
men to better understand mankind, law schools must identify and 
teach the core values of lawyering to better understand and promote 
our profession and our educational mission. 
II.  THE TRUE 
The wisdom for which all philosophers are in search is the 
knowledge of first principles and the causes of things.  
–Aristotle29 
 
The required law school curriculum places emphasis on the 
“true,” which the Greeks defined as “objective understanding” 
through rational thought.30  However, the subjects that law schools 
focus upon to impart this “objective understanding” to law students 
are limited primarily to substantive law and legal analysis; this focus 
largely minimizes the importance of many other foundational skills 
that lawyers need to practice successfully. 31   Other important 
lawyering skills that receive little or no attention in the core law 
school curriculum are negotiation, client interviewing, counseling, 
29. ARISTOTLE, ON MAN IN THE UNIVERSE 5 (Louise Ropes Loomis ed., John 
Henry MacMahon trans., 1971). 
30. ISAACS, supra note 13, at 13.  
31. Rubin, supra note 5, at 641–42. 
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and listening to name a few. 32   Therefore, law schools take too 
narrow a view of the relevant “truths” that form the core 
competencies of legal practice.  
The overuse of the case method of instruction, as valuable as 
it is in many respects, leaves students with the impression that legal 
disputes are always a battle that has winners and losers and serves to 
narrow their view of the appropriate roles they can play in their 
clients’ conflicts.33  Students read, over a course of years, hundreds 
of judicial opinions where disputes are resolved through litigation 
and where the techniques of evaluation and argument are the primary 
tools of dispute.34  However, for many decades, it has been obvious 
that law schools need to do more to educate lawyers in collaborative 
techniques for solving their clients’ problems.35  Nearly twenty years 
ago, Professor Paul Brest, former dean of Stanford Law School, 
32. Marjorie M. Schultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: 
Broadening the Basis for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 620 (2011) (listing 26 competencies for effective lawyering: (1) Analysis 
and Reasoning, (2) Creativity/Innovation, (3) Problem Solving, (4) Practical 
Judgment, (5) Researching the Law, (6) Fact Finding, (7) Questioning and 
Interviewing, (8) Influencing and Advocating, (9) Writing, (10) Speaking, (11) 
Listening, (12) Strategic Planning, (13) Organizing and Managing One’s Own 
Work, (14) Organizing and Managing Others (Staff/Colleagues), (15) Negotiation 
Skills, (16) Able to See the World Through the Eyes of Others, (17) Networking 
and Business Development, (18) Providing Advice & Counsel & Building 
Relationships with Clients, (19) Developing Relationships within the Legal 
Profession, (20) Evaluation, Development, and Mentoring, (21) Passion and 
Engagement, (22) Diligence, (23) Integrity/Honesty, (24) Stress Management, (25) 
Community Involvement and Serving, (26) Self-Development); see also ROY 
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD 
MAP 133, 207 (2007) (noting that even though “many teachers use the case method 
exclusively,” “other methods of instruction would accomplish their educational 
objectives more effectively” and thus, the use of the Socratic dialog and case 
method should be limited). 
33. Robert W. Gordon, The Geologic Strata of the Law School Curriculum, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 339, 341 (2007). 
34. Id. 
35. Four major studies have been done regarding the American Legal 
Education System in recent decades.  THE CRAMPTON REPORT, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF 
LAW SCHOOLS, A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR (1979); THE 
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 135–36; STUCKEY ET AL., supra, note 32, at 
207; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 111–13 (referring to the “Carnegie 
Report,” a comprehensive study of law school curricula). 
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observed that law schools were “strikingly weak in teaching other 
foundational skills and knowledge that lawyers need as counselors, 
problem solvers, negotiators, and as architects of transactions and 
organizations—roles that will pervade their professional lives.”36  In 
the twenty years since Professor Brest made that statement, law 
schools have made great progress incorporating courses on dispute 
resolution into their curricula.37  Yet, dispute resolution courses have 
still not made it into most law schools’ required core curricula, 
despite their foundational quality.38  In a recent report issued by the 
American Bar Association’s Task Force on the Future of Legal 
Education, the Task Force noted that much of what they heard “from 
recent graduates reflects a conviction that they received insufficient 
development of core competencies that make one an effective lawyer, 
particularly those relating to representation and service to clients.”39   
In the twenty-first century, collaborative advocacy will be 
among the most important skills that a litigator can possess to 
adequately serve their clients.  The twenty-first century litigator will 
need to be both a “collaborative advocate” and an “adversarial 
advocate,” as circumstances dictate.  Traditional law school 
education has focused on adversarial advocacy, which emphasizes a 
36. Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as 
Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 (1995).    
37. C. Michael Bryce, ADR Education from a Litigator/Educator Perspective, 
81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 337, 341–46 (2007) (describing the growth of ADR 
programs at American law schools). 
38. A survey concluded in 2012 by Professor Sean Nolon, Director of Dispute 
Resolution Program and Professor of Law at Vermont Law School, indicates that of the 
137 ABA-accredited law schools that responded only 10.5% of the schools require their 
students to take at least one non-litigation dispute resolution course to graduate.  More 
commonly, 27% of schools surveyed integrate ADR skills into other courses, like 
first-year Legal Research and Writing programs, but this integration usually amounts to 
not much more than a mere introduction to the topic.  Sean Nolon, Integrating 
Non-Litigation Dispute Resolution into the JD Curriculum: A Survey of U.S. 
ABA-Accredited Law Schools (unpublished survey) (on file with author).  For 
description of those schools that offer a free standing ADR course or as part of a 
another course see interview summaries at the following: 
http://vermontlaw.edu/Academics/Dispute_Resolution_Program/The_NLDR_Surv
ey/NLDR_Survey_Follow-Up_Interviews.htm. 
39. A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATION 26 (2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/da
m/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_and_recommendations_of
_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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“system of adjudication.” 40   By contrast, collaborative advocacy 
emphasizes “a system of conflict resolution that includes but is not 
limited to adjudication.” 41  Because the vast majority of litigated 
disputes are resolved through negotiation, it follows logically that 
“true” education in the law should provide teachings that enable 
lawyers to be effective in reaching favorable negotiated outcomes for 
their clients.42  It should trouble legal educators that negotiation is a 
central skill for all lawyers, especially litigators who resolve most of 
their disputes through this process, yet most law schools do not 
require negotiation in their core course of study. 43   Indeed, it is 
difficult to find another skill that so predominates the legal practice 
but is less represented in the core law school curriculum.44 
Collaborative advocacy requires a different set of substantive 
knowledge and skills, which law schools do not presently require as 
part of their core curricula.  Adversarial advocacy, which is the 
primary focus of most law schools’ core curricula, relies on a 
rights-based dispute resolution strategy that places emphasis on 
substantive legal knowledge, legal analysis, and argument. 45  
Collaborative advocacy, on the other hand, contemplates that 
lawyers may need to work with clients “to anticipate, raise, strategize, 
and negotiate over conflict, and if possible, to implement jointly 
agreed outcomes.”46  Collaboration is defined as a “process through 
which parties who see different aspects of a problem can 
40. MACFARLANE, supra note 27, at 110.  
41. Id. 
42. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and 
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL STUD. 459, 459–61, 
464 (2004) (discussing the decline in number of trials due to alternative dispute 
resolution forums). 
43. Nolon, supra note 38.  
44. Nolon, supra note 38; John Lande, Lessons from Teaching Students to 
Negotiate Like a Lawyer, 15 CARDOZO J. OF DISP. RES. 1, 1–2 (2013).  ADR courses 
are among neither the most commonly required courses nor the most highly 
recommended courses.  See Catherine L. Carpenter, A Survey of Law School 
Curricula 2002–2010, 43 A.B.A. SEC. EDUC. & ADMISSION TO BAR 13, 67–68 
(2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/mis
c/legal_education/2012_survey_of_law_school_curricula_2002_2010_executive_s
ummary.authcheckdam.pdf (listing the most common required and highly 
recommended courses). 
45. Id. at 49. 
46. MACFARLANE, supra note 27, at 109. 
                                                        
Symposium 2014]      TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LITIGATOR 751 
 
 
constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that 
go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.” 47  
Collaborative advocacy not only frequently requires a different set of 
knowledge and skills than adversarial advocacy, it often requires 
lawyers to use strategies that are polar opposites of those that might 
be effective in adjudicatory settings.  Instead of using intimidation, 
for example, a lawyer may be more effective pursing ingratiation; 
instead of stating aggressive positions, a lawyer may be more 
effective engaging in interest-based bargaining that embodies 
flexibility; instead of valuing secrecy, a lawyer may need to share 
information about weaknesses and concerns to arrive at mutually 
agreeable solutions.48  While both forms of advocacy are important, 
most law schools view collaborative advocacy, at best, as 
subordinate to adversarial advocacy, and, at worst, as optional.  
While collaborative advocacy has always been valuable to 
clients, it is even more important in the changing economy of the 
twenty-first century.  In this new economy, “more for less” will be a 
major driver of change in legal practice.49  In Tomorrow’s Lawyers, 
the incisive, clear-eyed examination of twenty-first century legal 
practice, Richard Susskind alerts us that general counsel are being 
asked to reduce their legal department budgets by as much as 50%.50  
Small businesses and private citizens are seeking similar reductions 
in the cost of legal assistance.51  One primary way for lawyers to 
meet this demand of “more for less” is to become skilled experts at 
collaborative advocacy because it resolves conflicts faster and more 
cost-effectively than adversarial advocacy.52 
For example, to achieve greater efficiency in dispute 
resolution, many organizations have adopted early settlement 
47. BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND FOR 
MULTIPARTY PROBLEMS 5 (1989). 
48. MACFARLANE, supra note 27, at 112. 
49. SUSSKIND, supra note 24, at 4. 
50. Id.  
51. Id. 
52. Lisa Blomgren Amsler et al., Dispute Resolution and the Vanishing Trial: 
Comparing Federal Government Litigation and ADR Outcomes, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 225, 258 (2009) (finding that ADR saved money); DAVID. B. LIPSKY 
ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS 
FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
PROFESSIONALS 77 (2003). 
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programs.53  In these programs, instead of engaging in protracted 
discovery and litigation, parties voluntarily exchange information 
about the dispute early in the process so that each can make 
meaningful case assessments as soon as practicable. 54   Once the 
parties have had a chance to assess the strengths and weaknesses of 
their cases, they engage in meaningful settlement discussions. 55  
These programs have saved companies millions of dollars and have 
helped maintain productive business relationships that likely would 
have been damaged or broken through more adversarial means.56  
Clients not only avoid expensive litigation costs but they also 
maintain greater control over both the process and the outcome of 
the dispute than they would have had in court.57  One of the most 
notable success stories for programs involving planned early 
assessment and settlement comes from the multinational landscaping 
product and service company, Toro Inc.  Toro estimates that between 
1991 and 1999, its early assessment and settlement program saved 
the company $50 million in litigation costs. 58   To achieve this 
success, however, organizations like Toro need lawyers who are as 
adept in collaborative advocacy as they are in adversarial advocacy.    
As collaborative advocates, the Toro lawyers needed to do 
more than analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the dispute and 
make legal arguments.  Collaborative advocates need a new kind of 
substantive knowledge and skills—a new set of truths, if you will, 
that historically are more closely associated with social science than 
with law.  One of these new truths is how to participate in a 
53. LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 52, at 90. 
54. See Colatrella, supra note 25, at 130–39 (presenting case studies of 
companies that have implemented unique conflict-management systems).  
55. See JOHN LANDE, LAWYERING WITH PLANNED EARLY NEGOTIATION: 
HOW YOU CAN GET GOOD RESULTS FOR CLIENTS AND MAKE MONEY 10–15 
(2011) (advising attorneys to carefully assess their client’s situation and interests, 
as well as the possible methods of dealing with the matter in every case prior to 
considering negotiations and settlement); LIPSKY, supra note 52, at 77. 
56. Miguel A. Olivella Jr., Toro’s Early Intervention Program, After Six 
Years, Has Saved $50M, 17 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 65, 65 (1999) 
(describing the reduction in Toro’s legal costs after implementing the early 
settlement program). 
57. Id.  For a discussion of another successful early settlement program, see 
Phillip M. Armstrong, Georgia-Pacific’s ADR Program: A Critical Review After 
10 Years, DISP. RESOL. J., May–July 2005, at 19.   
58. Olivella, supra note 56, at 65. 
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collaborative communication process that emphasizes the skills of 
interest-based problem solving and dialogue, as opposed to the skills 
of litigation and debate.  Interest-based problem solving is an 
essential skill for collaborative lawyers, yet most law students 
graduate not knowing what it is or having the slightest idea how to 
do it.  Popularized by the book Getting to Yes, interest-based 
problem solving is the most embraced concept in law school 
negotiation classes, but it is not part of most law schools’ required 
curricula.59  The second new set of truths law students should learn, 
especially litigators, is the science of decision-making and how 
psychological biases corrupt good strategic judgment.  This Article 
now briefly explores each of these topics to demonstrate how they 
are relevant in the litigation context. 
 A.  The Collaborative Communication Process   
Interest-based problem solving is a powerful technique that 
can be used to solve interpersonal disputes, including legal disputes.  
In interest-based problem solving, parties focus on their respective 
concerns and needs rather than on who is right or wrong.60  Here, the 
term “interests” refers not to what one likes to do in his or her spare 
time, like reading or skiing, but rather the underlying needs, 
concerns, or fears that are at the heart of the conflict. 61  Parties’ 
“[i]nterests define the problem.”62  Let’s look at a simple dispute 
between a tenant and a landlord to more concretely understand the 
term “interests.”  Suppose a tenant painted the walls of his apartment 
a bright pink color because it made him happy to look at it, but this 
act arguably violated a lease provision stating that the apartment 
walls must remain a “neutral color.”  In a rights-based dispute, which 
is how most lawyers would frame the problem, the dispute would be 
defined by whether the tenant had a legal right to paint the walls a 
59. Jim Hilbert, Collaborative Lawyering: A Process for Interest-Based 
Negotiation, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1083, 1087 (2010) (“[T]he vast majority of 
negotiation and dispute resolution law school courses advocate for the use of 
interest-based negotiation for doing deals and resolving conflict.”). 
60. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 11–12 (3d ed. 2011) (advising participants to focus on needs 
while attacking the problem, not each other). 
61. Id. at 43–44. 
62. Id. at 42–43. 
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bright pink, and would turn on the contractual issue of whether 
bright pink is a “neutral color.”  We can all imagine the arguments 
on each side of this issue.  Under an interest-based approach, 
however, the parties would be more focused on the underlying 
reasons for this clause in the lease, rather than the clause itself, and 
would explore possible solutions to meet those interests irrespective 
of the legal rights implicated.  In other words, what interests was the 
landlord trying to protect with the clause and how can they be 
protected while also satisfying the tenant’s interests?   
Let’s say the landlord included the “neutral paint” clause in 
the lease because he believes apartments that are painted a neutral 
color are more desirable to most prospective tenants, and he does not 
want to spend the time and money to repaint apartments of former 
tenants who liked bolder colors.  In an interest-based dispute process, 
the parties would look beyond legal rights to the needs that those 
rights were meant to serve.63 They would look for ways that both 
parties’ interests could be met, if possible. 64   One obvious 
interest-based solution that might work for both parties in this 
example is that the tenant may keep his walls pink, but must repaint 
them before he moves.  To protect the landlord’s interests, the parties 
agree in advance to the color and brand of paint.  The tenant could 
even agree to provide an extra security deposit to cover the cost of 
repainting the walls if he fails to live up to his end of the bargain.  
This solution preserves both the tenant’s interest in waking up every 
morning to enjoy the warm feeling that pink walls provide him and 
the landlord’s interest in having a neutral-colored apartment to rent. 
This was a simple example, but interest-based solutions are 
possible in disputes of every type and complexity.  For example, an 
interest-based solution was at the heart of the Camp David Accord 
between Egypt and Israel that President Jimmy Carter helped to 
broker in 1978.65  For days, the negotiations were stalled over how to 
divide the Sinai Peninsula, which Israel had occupied since the Six 
Day War in 1967.66  One side or the other rejected every permutation 
63. Id. at 42–43. 
64. See id. at 44 (noting that because opposing interests are not necessarily 
conflicting interests, efforts to accommodate both parties are likely to result in 
positive outcomes). 
65. Id. at 41–42. 
66. Id. 
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of proposed boundaries in an effort to reach a comprised solution.67  
Only when the parties began focusing on their underlying interests 
did a solution emerge. 68   Israel’s main concern in handing the 
peninsula back to the Egyptians was that the Egyptians could then 
place military forces on Israel’s border, threatening its security.69  
Egypt believed allowing Israel to retain the peninsula undermined its 
sovereignty in land that it had controlled for nearly 4,000 years.70  
Once these interests were fully understood and appreciated, the 
countries agreed to a “plan that would return the Sinai to complete 
Egyptian sovereignty and, by demilitarizing large areas, would still 
assure Israeli security.” 71  Thus, an interest-based process helped 
produce one of the few lasting peaceful solutions to one of the most 
complex and intractable border disputes in the Middle East.72  But 
attorneys, in general, are not inclined to think about disputes in an 
interest-based way, are they? 
Attorneys tend to think in terms of what is right and wrong—
legal or illegal.73  Attorneys generally start with a position and use 
argument, persistence, and power to win the battle. 74  Yet, when 
attorneys engage in collaborative processes like negotiation and 
mediation, they often continue to choose aggressive strategies guided 
by the “dominant values and beliefs” that they learned in law 
school. 75   This is why positional bargaining and engaging in 
negotiation as a “zero-sum,” rights-based process are so prevalent in 
legal negotiations. 76   Of course, there is nothing wrong with 
approaching problems this way in adjudicatory processes like 
litigation and arbitration, but many attorneys take this approach all 







73. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 29, 45 (1982) (“Lawyers are trained to put people and events into 
categories that are legally meaningful, to think in terms of rights and duties 
established by rules . . . ”). 
74. MACFARLANE, supra note 27, at 76. 
75. Id. at 75. 
76. Id. at 75–76. 
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are engaged and oblivious that they are doing a disservice to their 
clients.  Law school often leaves students who are naturally inclined 
to use collaborative processes feeling as if they have no choice but to 
be adversarial.  The following statement typifies the sentiment of 
many lawyers: “My nature, my personality has always been much 
more collaborative.  I struggled to get that adversarial model to begin 
with.  It never felt right.  I always felt that I wasn’t giving as good a 
service to my clients as I could be giving but I was forced into it 
because that is what the system required.”77  Educating law students 
in interest-based problem solving broadens their “philosophical map” 
as to the kinds of tools and problem-solving “frames” that are 
acceptable for lawyers to use.78 
While interest-based strategies are not always possible or 
appropriate, all attorneys should have the knowledge and skills to 
participate meaningfully in them because an interest-based strategy 
will frequently best serve the needs of the client.  Interest-based 
problem solving has three distinct advantages over a positional style 
of bargaining.  First, settlement is more likely because parties make a 
concerted effort to look at the other’s underlying needs and 
concerns.79  Second, when parties focus on trying to meet the other’s 
underlying needs and concerns, they are often able to come up with 
multiple potential solutions, which further increases the likelihood 
that one of those solutions will be acceptable to both parties. 80  
Finally, because interest-based bargaining relies more on strategies 
and tactics that build relationships, like flexibility, empathy, and 
openness, and less on adversarial strategies and tactics, like 
inflexibility, threats, and deception, it makes it more likely that the 
disputants’ relationship can be preserved or, at least, not further 
damaged. 81   Positional bargaining, which is most often used in 
adversarial advocacy, ignores the other party’s concerns and needs— 
further polarizing the parties and increasing animosity. 82   Parties 
simply state their position and make arguments as to why they are 
77. Id. at 107. 
78. Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, supra note 73, at 43. 




82. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 23, at 907. 
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entitled to it.83  This strategy undermines interest-based negotiation.  
In fact, “arguments for one’s own position or against the other’s 
position” are among the most destructive in obtaining interest-based 
outcomes.84  Indeed, to maximize interest-based processes, lawyers 
need to rely primarily on an entirely different communication style, 
one with which most students are unfamiliar. 
Collaborative advocacy benefits most from a communication 
style that emphasizes dialogue, rather than debate.  “Dialogue” 
originates from the Greek word “dialogos.”85  “Dia” means “through” 
and “logos” means the “word.”86  Thus, loosely translated, dialogue 
means gaining understanding through the exchange of words.87  It is 
“about a shared inquiry, a way of thinking and reflecting together.”88  
Dialogue involves a certain way of communicating that is 
characterized by definable elements.  Notice how the following 
characteristics of dialogue are so uncharacteristic of what many 
lawyers define as good advocacy.  The first characteristic of dialogue 
is the absence of coercive influences.89  People in dialogue do not 
engage in arm-twisting or rank-pulling. 90   Second, people in 
dialogue listen with empathy. 91   The focus on listening is to 
understand the other party’s concerns and needs, and to attempt to 
view the problem from the other party’s perspective. 92  Empathy 
involves not just intellectually understanding the other party’s point 
of view, but also understanding how the situation affects them 
emotionally.  In other words, empathy is “the ability to think 
83. Id. 
84. LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 88 (4th 
ed. 2009).  “Substantiation” is the term for the type of positional arguments 
commonly used by attorneys in negotiation.  Substantiation is a relatively 
ineffective strategy in collaborative negotiation processes because 
“[s]ubstantiation begets more substantiation.”  Id. (citing Laurie R. Weingart et al., 
Knowledge Matters: The Effect of Tactical Descriptions on Negotiation Behavior 
and Outcome, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1205, 1205–17 (1996)). 
85. DAVID BOHM, ON DIALOGUE 6 (1996). 
86. Id.  
87. Id. at 7. 
88. ISAACS, supra note 13, at 9. 
89. DANIEL YANKELOVICH, THE MAGIC OF DIALOGUE 42 (2001).  
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 43. 
92. Id. 
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someone else’s thoughts and feel someone else’s feelings.”93  Third, 
and finally, dialogue attempts to expose the assumptions underlying 
a person’s views.94  It encourages all participants to examine their 
own assumptions, as well as the assumptions of others with 
respect.95   
Attorneys are trained almost exclusively to engage in debate 
rather than dialogue.   While dialogue is about “thinking together,” 
debate is about “imposing thought.”96  Debate is the primary form of 
communication in adversarial advocacy.97  The essence of debate is 
to “win the argument, vanquish an opponent.” 98  Communication 
changes when “winning” is the primary objective: In debate, one 
assumes that he is right and tries to prove the other wrong, instead of 
assuming that through “thinking together” participants might come 
to a more complete understanding of the problem.99  In debate, one 
argues for a self-serving solution instead of exploring solutions that 
might also be acceptable to the other party.100  In debate, one listens 
to find flaws and weaknesses in the other’s perspective to exploit 
them, instead of listening “to understand and to find meaning and 
agreement.”101  Debate and other forms of adversarial advocacy are 
important aspects of good lawyering in adjudicatory proceedings 
because there is a judge or arbitrator who will decide which advocate 
has the better argument and who will be declared a “winner.”  
Debate has limited utility in the collaborative process, however, 
because there is no independent adjudicator and, thus, parties must 
arrive at a mutually acceptable solution.102 
93. Id.   
94. Id. at 44. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 39. 
97. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 23, at 907 (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 11 (1996)). 
98. Yankelovich, supra note 89, at 38. 
99. Id. at 39. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. THOMPSON, supra note 84, at 88.  These skills will most commonly be 
used when resolving disputes in either bi-lateral negotiations or mediations.  
However, they are also essential in variety of other professional interactions when 
attorneys will engage with colleagues and clients, such as negotiating litigation 
strategy, compensation, and workload.  Id. at 88. 
                                                        
Symposium 2014]      TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LITIGATOR 759 
 
 
B. The Settlement Decision-Making Process 
The second area of substantive knowledge and skills related 
to collaborative advocacy that should be added to law schools’ core 
curricula is the science of decision-making.  This is an especially 
critical topic for litigators in the context of settlement.  There are two 
primary decisions in a litigation settlement in which lawyers play a 
central role: (1) whether to settle and (2) what amount to accept in 
the settlement.  These are two of the most important questions on 
which litigators advise their clients, yet lawyers receive “scant” 
substantive training in law school from which to draw upon in 
rendering this critical legal advice. 103   This lack of education 
demonstrates itself in the field, unfortunately.  Studies examining 
lawyers’ competency in making good settlement recommendations 
have revealed a “high incidence of decision-making error by both 
plaintiffs and defendants.”104  Therefore, this is clearly an area that 
needs improvement for lawyers to be successful.   
The most recent and comprehensive of these telling studies 
found considerable settlement error in 2,054 California civil cases.105  
The large sample size reveals the importance of this issue.  This 
study included 5,116 attorneys, which was estimated to be 
approximately 17–21% of all civil litigation attorneys in the state of 
California at the time.106  The study defined a “decision error” as 
occurring when “either a plaintiff or a defendant decides to reject an 
adversary’s settlement offer, proceeds to trial, and finds that the 
result at trial is financially the same as or worse than the rejected 
settlement offer . . . .”107  The study made several important findings.  
First, the study found that plaintiffs made decision errors in 61.2% of 
the cases, producing an average loss of $43,100 per decision error.108  
103. RANDALL KISER, HOW LEADING LAWYERS THINK 117 (2011). 
104. See, e.g., Randall L. Kiser et al., Let’s Not Make a Deal: An Empirical 
Study of Decision-Making in Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiations, 5 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 551, 551 (2008) (stating that, based on comparisons of parties’ 
settlement positions to ultimate awards or verdicts reached in arbitration or trial, 
both plaintiffs and defendants are subject to a high incidence of decision-making 
errors).  
105. Id. at 552 [hereinafter California Decision Error Study]. 
106. Id. at 560. 
107. Id. at 563. 
108. Id. at 566. 
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Let that statistic sink in for a moment.  Essentially, this means that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys would have done better flipping a coin.  With 
regard to defense counsel, the study found that although defendants 
had a lower incidence of decision error, the cost of those errors was 
alarmingly higher.109  The decision error rate for the defendants was 
24.3%, but those errors reaped an unfortunate average cost of 
$1,140,000 for their clients.110  These numbers are consistent with 
earlier, smaller studies. 111   Certainly, while economic case 
evaluation is never going to be an exact science because of the 
subjective human elements involved, these statistics are worrisome 
and likely reflect a lack of education on case evaluation during law 
school and beyond.112 
Law schools are not teaching lawyers any systematic way of 
evaluating cases for settlement, which is necessary both to arriving at 
more accurate decisions on whether to settle and to achieving good 
settlement results.  In these times, when few cases are resolved 
through adjudication, the primary way litigators bring value to their 
clients is through their ability to achieve good settlement results.113  
It is more than reasonable for law schools to address this in their 
curricula if they intend to produce graduates who are at least 
minimally prepared for legal practice.  The basic principles of 
economic case evaluation are not difficult to comprehend.  It simply 
is a topic inexplicably ignored in the core content of legal education.  
It is a concept, however, taught in good negotiation and mediation 
courses. 114   In 1983, Professor Gerald Williams published Legal 
Negotiation and Settlement, one of the first negotiation texts for law 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. See Jeffrey Rachlinski, Gains, Losses and the Psychology of Litigation, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 114, 154 (1996) (finding in a study of 656 cases that 
plaintiffs had a 56.1% decision error rate with an average cost of $27,687 and 
defendants had a 23% decision error rate with an average cost of $354,949); 
Samuel Gross & Kent Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations 
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1996). 
112. Lack of feedback in the process leads attorneys to fail to take 
responsibility for their bad decision-making.  RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT 
AND WRONG 78 (2010). 
113. KISER, supra note 103, at 113. 
114. JAY FOLBERG & DWIGHT GOLANN, LAWYER NEGOTIATION: THEORY, 
PRACTICE, AND LAW 160 (2006); BOULLE ET AL., supra note 79, at 190–95.  
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students.115  In his book he has a section titled, “Economic Analysis 
of Cases: The Missing Lawyer Skill.”116  Professor Williams says 
that “[l]awyers are, in a sense, trapped by the legal culture into 
non-quantifiable and non-objective methods of evaluating cases.”117  
In light of the California Decision Error Study, explained above, 
more than thirty years later it appears that the legal culture has not 
changed much and that the economic case evaluation skill is still 
missing.   
Economic case evaluation is defined as “estimating the 
monetary value of a legal claim and determining the costs and 
consequences of realizing that value.” 118   This type of case 
evaluation involves, in part, calculating the “expected value” of the 
case.  Expected value is the amount the case is worth if settled now 
as compared to the possible value of the case if it is adjudicated.119  
Explained from the plaintiff’s perspective: how much will she accept 
now in exchange for giving up the chance of obtaining a greater 
amount later (usually much later) if the case is tried?120  Explained 
from the defendant’s perspective: how much will she pay now to 
avoid the risk of paying a greater amount later? 121   This is the 
question that litigants confront every time they contemplate settling a 
dispute. To answer this question, the litigant and his lawyer need to 
know, at minimum, three values: (1) the probable average verdict, 
(2) the probability of a plaintiff’s verdict, and (3) the cost of 
obtaining the verdict.  Once these values are obtained, a simple 
calculation will provide the expected value of the case.122   
Let’s look at a simple example to illustrate basic case 
evaluation.  Assume that the plaintiff was injured in a car accident 
115. GERALD WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983). 
116. Id. at 110. 
117. Id. at 111. 
118. KISER, supra note 103, at 113. 
119. PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, 
DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT 477 (2010). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 478. 
122. See Richard Birke, Decision Trees—Made Easy, in LAWYER 
NEGOTIATION: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 160 (2006) (discussing the use of 
decision trees in evaluating the worth of a lawsuit based on factors, such as the 
probability a plaintiff will prove each element of the tort, the possible award, and 
the costs incurred). 
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and argues that the defendant was negligent.  His attorney estimates 
that the probable average verdict, assuming liability, would be 
$100,000.123  This is not his best day in court, or his worst day in 
court; rather, it is his most likely damage award. 124   Next, the 
attorney estimates that the probability of achieving a plaintiff’s 
verdict is 60%, taking into consideration the relevant facts, the 
current law, and the emotional appeal of the case.125  Finally, the 
plaintiff’s lawyer estimates that the cost of obtaining the verdict will 
be $10,000.126  To calculate the expected value, you multiply the 
probable average verdict ($100,000) by the percentage probability of 
success (60%), and then subtract the cost of the verdict ($10,000).127  
The expected value in this example would be $50,000.  The equation 
looks like this: 
 
$100,000    x     60%  =  $60,000     -  $10,000    =  $50,000 
Probable   Probability    Cost of  Expected 
Verdict    of success   Verdict  Value  
 
There are other equations for calculating expected value that 
are much more complicated than this. 128   They can include 
calculations regarding the time-value of money, estimates of the 
business costs of the litigation, or the business benefit of going to 
trial—such as establishing a precedent relevant to the business.129  
However, at a minimum, addressing at least the three values 
discussed above will provide a more objective economic evaluation 




127. Id. When the litigant is a defendant the cost of litigation is added to the 
expected value because this is what they would need to spend anyway to resolve 
the dispute. BOULLE ET AL., supra note 79, at 193. 
128. See, e.g., Paul Prestia & Harrie Samaras, Beyond Decision Trees: 
Determining Aggregate Probabilities of Time, Cost, and Outcomes, 28 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 89 (2010) (describing “Augmented Option 
Analysis” as a tool beyond conventional “Decision Tree Analysis” 
for evaluating litigation settlements that aggregate the probabilities of all possible 
ultimate outcomes to provide a more complete picture of the possibilities 
associated with any option). 
129. Birke, supra note 122, at 160–61. 
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of the case than simply operating on gut feeling, which is what many 
attorneys do.130   
The entire analysis of expected value is still subjective, but 
having a systematic process for addressing each subjective element 
in the case evaluation exercise brings more objectivity, and 
consequently, consistency and predictability, to the results.  For 
example, the assessment of the probable damage award and the 
probability of achieving that award are subjective evaluations.  They 
are dependent upon the experience and the accuracy of the 
attorney.131  Nevertheless, having a formula for calculating expected 
value forces the attorney to parse through damages and determine 
what she realistically can prove.132  In addition, under this model, an 
attorney would assign a specific percentage chance of success based 
on factors such as the merits of the case, public records of verdicts in 
similar cases, and the attorney’s experience in similar cases, as 
opposed to assigning the case such ambiguous terms as “strong case” 
or “weak case.”133  Attorneys should also be aware of the need to 
factor in the estimated cost of litigation as part of the value of the 
case, a factor often ignored or considered only after costs have 
escalated to unreasonable degrees.134  
Beyond the basic factors of good economic case evaluation 
discussed above, there is also a related body of social science 
principles that lawyers should be trained to consider to better 
conduct a sound economic case analysis.135  These are psychological 
biases and heuristics (mental shortcuts) that operate on a 
130. Id.  
131. See id. at 162 (noting that attorneys have to evaluate the probable 
outcome of each factor that affects the case). 
132. See id. at 162–64 (explaining how to incorporate expected awards when 
using a decision tree to determine the realistic value of a case and probability of 
success).  
133. Marjore Corman Aaron, Finding Settlement with Numbers, Maps, and 
Trees, THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 204 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert 
C. Bordone eds. 2005). 
134. See Birke, supra note 122, at 163 (deducting trial expenses from the 
expected award). 
135. JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR 
LAWYERS 291 (2013) (stating that psychological bias, like confirmation bias, the 
fundamental attribution error, and naïve realism are factors that can affect 
economic case evaluation). 
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subconscious level to undermine good decision-making. 136  
Attorneys would not even realize their influence on their case 
evaluation without specific training and a conscious effort to identify 
and mitigate them. 137   Cognitive specialists have identified and 
studied over 100 decision-making biases that undermine good 
decisions.138  Lawyers would benefit from, at a minimum, training in 
some of the more common biases that affect litigation choices. 
To illustrate this point further, let us look briefly at two of the 
more relevant biases, selective perception and risk frames, in the 
context of a hypothetical litigation example: a wrongful death 
lawsuit by a family in a small rural town against a large corporation.  
Assume that the defense counsel for “ABC Corp.” has evaluated the 
facts and determined the company has a pretty good chance of 
success on the legal merits.  Unfortunately, the settlement demand is 
quite high and the plaintiff is unwilling to negotiate because the 
plaintiff’s attorney correctly assesses that the case has significant 
emotional appeal to a local jury.  Accordingly, the defense 
recommends that ABC Corp. proceed to trial, unwilling to place 
much value on the emotional appeal of the circumstances of the case.  
The emotional appeal of the case is significant, however.  The 
decedent was a young man in his twenties who was well known 
around town and well loved.  His death was well publicized in this 
small working-class community that favors the “mom-and-pop” 
store over “big business.”  The family is devastated and its grief is 
very visible locally.  At trial, ABC Corp. is shocked by a 
multi-million dollar verdict, which is, of course, way beyond the 
value that the defense counsel predicted.  The defense counsel is 
disconcerted because his “gut” tells him the case is not worth that 
verdict.   
When evaluating a case like this, the defense counsel would 
benefit from training in the dangers of selective perception and risk 
frames.  “Selective perception” is the principle that humans are 
preconditioned to see only what they want to see, leading to a 
self-serving bias.139  Indeed, a person is actively seeking to support 
his assumed and usually preferred view of the world.  Professor 
136. KISER, supra note 112, at 90. 
137. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 135, at 15. 
138. KISER, supra note 112, at 90. 
139. Id. at 102. 
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Deanna Kuhn, an expert in reasoning, explains the internal, 
unconscious thought process as follows: “Here is some evidence I 
can point to as support for my theory and therefore the theory is 
right.” 140   In litigation, this bias manifests when an attorney 
unwittingly minimizes detrimental facts and unduly emphasizes facts 
favorable to his client, biasing his view of the case.  For example, in 
an experiment where students were asked to evaluate the value of a 
litigated case, students’ assessments differed significantly based on 
whom they represented, even though they were presented with the 
same set of facts.141  In this study, where the plaintiff was suing for 
$100,000, the students who were randomly assigned the role of 
plaintiff’s attorney valued the case at $17,709 more than those 
randomly assigned the role of defendant’s attorney.142  It should be 
emphasized that this significant bias occurred after spending 
relatively little time with the case in the role of either plaintiff’s or 
defendant’s counsel.  How much more bias do you think can occur 
when an attorney spends months or years with a case?  
 In our wrongful death hypothetical, above, the defense 
counsel only wanted to focus on the legal merits because he believed 
ABC Corp. was in a good legal posture.  He diminished the 
overwhelming facts regarding the challenges of trying the case in an 
unfriendly environment of small town working class folk, as well as 
the sympathetic appeal of the decedent and his family.  Emotional 
factors are relevant to advocacy, whether they undermine or support 
your case.143  The failure to address this bias had severe negative 
consequences for the client. 
A second principle to which litigators must be attentive is 
“risk frame.”  The concept of risk frame states that people view the 
risk of the case differently based on whether they are in a position to 
gain money or to lose money, even when the statistical risk is 
140. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE 
DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 93 (2013) (quoting Deanna Kuhn, Children 
and Adults as Intuitive Scientists, 96 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 681 (1989)). 
141. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the 
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 813 (2001).  
142. Id. 
143. The issue of giving little or no consideration to emotional aspects of a 
case can also be attributed to a lack of emotional intelligence. KISER, supra note 
104, at 78. 
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objectively the same.144  People are risk-averse when they are facing 
financial gains, and they are more likely to take risk when they are 
facing financial losses.145  In other words, people are “conservative 
when given a chance to lock in a win, but daring when given a 
chance to avoid a loss.” 146   Here is a simple illustration of this 
concept based on an experiment conducted by Nobel Prize winner 
Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues.  Kahneman presented 
participants with two sets of alternatives.  In the first set, participants 
had to choose between “a sure gain of $240” and a “25% chance to 
gain $1000,” which is a 75% chance of gaining nothing. 147  
Participants, by a margin of 84%, chose the sure gain of $240, the 
risk-averse alternative, even though the expected value of the 25% 
chance of gaining $1000 was worth slightly more—$250.148  In the 
second set, Kahneman presented participants with a new set of 
alternatives:  They could choose a “sure loss of $750” or a “75% 
chance to lose $1000 and 25% chance of losing nothing.”149  In this 
set, 87% of participants chose the “75% chance of losing $1000,” the 
risk-seeking alternative.150  
Applying the loss/gain frame concept to our wrongful death 
hypothetical, ABC Corp. was facing significant financial losses if a 
settlement was reached, so it was more willing to roll the dice for the 
chance of losing nothing. 151   This bias operated to cause the 
defendant to behave in a riskier way because of its vantage point in 
framing the risk involved in the case.  Therefore, this bias 
contributed to a wrong decision by corrupting the decision-making 
process.  Indeed, research supports the conclusion that “defendants’ 
propensity to take risky settlement positions increased as their risk of 
loss increased.” 152  This explains, in part, why defendants in the 
California Decision Error Study, discussed above, produced such 
costly mistakes. 
144. KISER, supra note 112, at 111. 
145. Id. 
146. DAVID G. MEYERS, INTUITION: ITS POWERS AND PERILS 155 (2002). 




151. Id. at 113. 
152. Id. 
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Attorneys can take precautions to avoid the pitfalls of 
common psychological biases, and the law school curriculum should 
teach them those precautions.  First, having a clear decision-making 
process helps to avoid a situation where the emotions of either the 
client or the lawyer will overtake the process.153  In addition, seeking 
independent evaluations from third parties can help provide a reality 
check for both the lawyer and the client. 154   Lawyers can also 
explicitly seek out evidence that undermines their preferred theory of 
the case as a way of balancing their evaluation.155  All of these have 
proven to be useful strategies in mitigating the effects of faulty 
frames and selective perception. 156   If law students are educated 
about the existence of these psychological biases and ways to avoid 
them, they will be well positioned to provide higher quality 
decision-making guidance to their clients.  
Those who master the “missing skill” of case evaluation will 
have an “overwhelming advantage in negotiations and trials” in the 
twenty-first century.157  The California Decision Error Study on case 
evaluation found that attorneys who had training and experience in 
serving as mediators had a lower decision error rate.158  The study 
specifically gathered data on whether the attorney involved in the 
case had experience as a mediator.159  For purposes of the study, the 
following activities qualified as having mediation experience: 
serving on “superior court mediation panels, being affiliated with 
private dispute resolution companies, or currently being a member of 
the Southern California Mediation Association.”160  In cases where 
attorneys had mediation experience, the decision error for both 
plaintiffs and defendants was lower.  Attorney-mediators 
representing plaintiffs had a 48.5% decision error rate as compared 
to the 61.2% decision error rate for the primary sample.161  In cases 
153. Id. at 108. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 135, at 15. 
157. KISER, supra note 103, at 117. 
158. Kiser et al., supra note 104, at 586–87. 
159. Id.  For this aspect of the study, the investigators searched cases from 
1985 to 2006 and identified 369 cases that met the case-study criteria.  Id.  
160. Id. at 51–52 (noting that California requires a minimum of thirty hours 
of mediation training to serve as a mediator in court-connected litigation).  
161. Id. at 587. 
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where attorney-mediators represented defendants, their decision 
error rate was 21.5% as compared to 24.3% decision error rate for 
the primary sample. 162   This reduction is statistically significant, 
raising the question of why attorney-mediators make better case 
evaluation decisions.163  The answer to this question may lie in their 
enhanced skills as collaborative advocates.  
Collaborative advocacy, which includes, among other things, 
interest-based problem solving, dialogue, case evaluation, and 
decision-making, must find its way into the core legal curriculum.164  
Clients in the new economy will no longer pay the high cost of 
prolonged conflict that adversarial advocacy often creates.165  To be 
competitive in this new economy, lawyers must also be adept at 
collaborative advocacy.  Including courses on negotiation, mediation, 
and alternative dispute resolution in the law school core curriculum 
should help remedy this deficiency.   If law schools desire to offer a 
legal education that produces fulfilled and successful lawyers, they 
should seek to make their curricula more “true” by adding 
substantive teachings, like the ones discussed above, that truly 
prepare the lawyer for the profession.  There are, of course, many 
lawyers who are expert collaborative advocates, but they possess 
these skills in spite of law school, not because of it.  Law schools 
that continue to see collaborative advocacy skills as optional and 
adjunct to adversarial advocacy skills, rather than required and 
equally valuable, will find themselves increasingly at odds with the 





164. KENNETH CLOKE, MEDIATING DANGEROUSLY 174–76 (2001). 
165. See SUSSKIND, supra note 24, at 4–5 (noting that access to legal 
counsel is unaffordable for many when legal services are delivered in the 
traditional way).  
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III.  THE GOOD  
How far that little candle throws his beams!  So shines a 
good deed in a naughty world.166 
–William Shakespeare 
 
Even the best lawyers, with the most upright natures, will 
from time to time find themselves faced with moral decisions where 
it is not immediately obvious which direction to take.   While the 
Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility courses taught in law 
school provide some basic guidelines for lawyers in this area, they 
by no means constitute a complete handbook for lawyers that will 
ensure good, just, and right decisions in all circumstances.  
Accordingly, when the interests of the client are in conflict with 
some other good or just interest, or when lawyers find themselves in 
situations where there is no law or guidance, questions can arise as to 
how the lawyer should exercise her discretionary judgment with 
respect to these moral questions.  These questions often involve 
matters of integrity, self-discipline, humility, respect, self-control, 
compassion, accountability, responsibility, honesty, and justice—all 
of which fall in the overarching category of “goodness.”  There is no 
practical way to regulate “goodness” in lawyering.  Yet, public 
confidence in the legal profession increases when lawyers display 
these qualities.  Thus, we must rely on individual lawyers to 
self-limit or self-regulate their behavior in the absence of clear, 
written guidance to exhibit good moral decision-making and, 
consequently, establish strong public confidence in the profession. 
Certainly, lawyers are making moral judgments every day 
that call upon their sense of “goodness,” and some feel more 
prepared for these judgments than others.  They use their own 
internal compass developed from whatever quality of background 
education and experience they have brought with them to their legal 
practice, but unfortunately their law school education does not 
formally or systematically contribute very much to the development 
of this moral compass.  This naturally provokes discussion on 
whether the law school curriculum can be crafted to improve lawyers’ 
excellence in this area.  Should law schools be concerned with 
166. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 5, sc. 1, lines 
90–91 (Stephen Orgel & A.R Braunmuller eds., 2002).    
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producing lawyers who practice with “goodness” and if so, how can 
this be promoted? 
Ancient Greece, the first successfully self-governed society 
of the world, offers some useful guidance on how to promote 
“goodness” and justice in the absence of written laws.167  The answer, 
ancient Greeks believed, was found in a concept that is best 
conveyed through the phrase “know thyself.”168  Self-government is 
one of the purest forms of freedom, and the Greeks highly valued 
freedom in all areas. 169   Yet, they wisely contemplated that the 
enjoyment of freedom also required the willingness to self-limit their 
own freedom.170  The ancient Greeks taught that goodness comes 
from limits, self-control, and self-mastery of the free individual.171  
In her book, Hamilton offers further explanation of this concept: 
This conception of what freedom means 
dawned upon the Greeks.  The quality they valued 
most—the Greek word is sophrosune—cannot be 
expressed by any single English word.  It is oftenest 
translated by self control, but it meant more than that.  
It was the spirit behind the two great Delphic sayings, 
“Know thyself” and “Nothing in excess.”  Arrogance, 
insolent self-assertions, was of all qualities most 
detested by the Greeks.  Sophrosune was the exact 
opposite.  It had its nature, as Aristotle would say, in 
167. The ancient Greeks believed in promoting good character even though 
“they had no authoritative Sacred Book, no creed, no ten commandments, no 
dogmas.”  Hamilton, supra note 8, at 216.  Despite no dogma, the ancient Greeks 
had an ideal of “excellence” in human affairs.  See id. at 217.  Moreover, this 
excellence was driven by “straining impulses to unrestricted freedom, shunning 
excess, obeying the inner laws of harmony and proportion.”  See EDITH HAMILTON, 
THE ECHO OF GREECE 21 (1957).  In this pursuit, written laws were subordinate to 
man’s self-regulation.  Id. 
168. THE ECHO OF GREECE, supra note 167, at 21.  
169. Id. at 12. 
170. Id. at 18. 
171. Id. at 12.  In referencing Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Plutarch, 
Hamilton states: “To them, as to all Greeks, freedom was first in importance.  
Fundamental to everything the Greeks achieved was their conviction that good for 
humanity was possible only if men were free, body, mind, and spirit, and if each 
man limited his own freedom.  A good state or work of art or piece of thinking was 
possible only through the self-mastery of the free individual, self-government.”  Id. 
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the excellent and it meant accepting the bounds of 
excellence laid down for human nature, restraining 
impulses to unrestricted freedom, shunning excess, 
obeying the inner laws of harmony and proportion. . . . 
That was the Greek ideal, and the result was their 
freedom.  The idea that only the man who holds 
himself within self-chosen limits can be free is one of 
their great legacies to us.172 
Interestingly, the ancient Greeks further acknowledged that it 
was the “[w]illing obedience to law written and unwritten” that made 
them free; however, they attached greater importance to the 
unwritten law.173  They observed that the written laws, such as the 
law against robbery, had little effect on most people because most 
people do not have the impulse to violate them.174  By contrast, the 
unwritten law is essentially an unenforceable code of conduct that 
includes things such as “kindness and compassion and unselfishness 
and all the long list of qualities without which life would be 
intolerable except to a hermit in a desert.” 175   Therefore, they 
believed that this unwritten law, which carried no penalty but applied 
universally to everyone, had broader implications for society and 
therefore warranted greater attention.176   
Lawyers are taught a set of “written laws,” which are the 
ethical rules or shared values of the profession.  They are designed to 
promote the “good” in the profession, but they are taught little about 
the “unwritten laws” that each of them will necessarily integrate into 
their discretionary moral decisions when practicing law, which carry 
no legal penalty and have no enforceability.  These unwritten laws 
are the lawyers’ personal values or morals.177  Just as the ancient 
Greeks’ approach to self-mastery involved the endeavor to “know 
thyself,” law schools could better assist law students in preparing for 
legal practice by engaging them in a process to cultivate their 
172. Id. at 21–22. 
173. Id. at 20. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 21. 
176. Id. at 20. 
177. Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The 
Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and 
Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 420 n.32, 480 (2005). 
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personal “responsible moral judgment.”178  To accomplish this, law 
schools should engage law students in a systematic study of the 
process of incorporating morals into legal practice by exploring a 
variety of moral perspectives as applied to common ethical and 
moral dilemmas that students will likely encounter practicing law.  
In part, this means emphasizing core professional values that have 
both an ethical and moral dimension, such as honesty, integrity, and 
justice.  It also means supporting law students in developing their 
own moral principles in the context of the law and helping them to 
avoid common errors in moral decision-making.  Such an education 
will increase students’ likelihood of successfully navigating the 
variety of moral and ethical dilemmas that they will encounter in 
legal practice, making them more satisfied and better lawyers, as 
well as elevating the profession.179  
In short, law schools currently teach some, but not enough of, 
the “good.”  Most law school professional ethics courses focus 
almost exclusively on the “law of lawyering,” which usually 
involves the examination of regulations, statutes, and case law.180  
The core of the professional ethical rules are codified in the 
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Model Rules), which nearly every state has adopted in some 
form. 181   These rules cover a variety of topics, ranging from 
attorney–client relations to zealous advocacy.182  Despite the number, 
complexity, and variety of these rules, however, a vast sphere of 
lawyer behavior is left unregulated. 183  Moreover, topics that are 
covered by the rules often leave significant discretion for lawyers to 
178. Katherine Franke, Occupy Wall Street’s Message for Lawyers, NAT’L 
L.J., Nov. 21, 2011. 
179. Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and 
Personal Satisfaction: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 
CLINICAL L. REV. 425, 429 (2005) (stating that “[e]mperical research for the past 
two decades has shown that when intrinsic values and motivation  dominate a 
person’s choices she tends to experience satisfaction and well-being, whereas 
when extrinsic values and motivation are most important to her she will experience 
angst and distress”). 
180. Id.  
181. Barton, supra note 177, at 436–37.   
182. Nathan Crystal, Using the Concept of “A Philosophy of Lawyering” in 
Teaching Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1235, 1241 (2007). 
183. Id. at 1237. 
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act as they deem best.184  Occasionally some ethical rules conflict 
with no clear guidance regarding which rule takes precedence.185  
Thus, lawyers have significant latitude in how to resolve the many 
ethical issues that they will confront in practice.186  Most importantly, 
ethical concerns usually implicate moral concerns for which the rules 
provide no guidance.  
A classic example of an ethical issue with a significant moral 
dimension involves the attorney ethical duty of confidentiality.  
Model Rule 1.6 states, in part, that a “lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client.”187  There are, 
however, several exceptions to this general rule.188  One exception is 
that “a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.” 189  
Suppose that a lawyer learns through representation that his client, a 
sole proprietorship, is discharging toxic chemicals into the 
environment to such a degree that the exception to confidentiality 
would be met—the lawyer would have the legal right to reveal the 
pollution to the proper authorities, but would not be required to do 
so. 190  This is sometimes referred to as a “right vs. right” moral 
dilemma. 191  It is right to honor one’s duties of zealousness and 
loyalty to one’s client, but it is also right to “prevent reasonably 
certain death or substantial bodily injury” to others.192  Which course 
of action should the lawyer choose?  Either is ethical, but which is 
“right” or “morally good?”  
Lawyers regularly confront this type of “right versus right” 




187. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2013). 
188. Id. at R. 1.6(b). 
189. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1). 
190. Id. (providing for permissive rather than mandatory disclosure of 
information regarding the representation of a client in circumstances where the 
duty not to reveal such information is waived). 
191. JOSEPH L BADARACCAO, JR., DEFINING MOMENTS 9 (1997). 
192. Id. 
                                                        
774 THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION [Vol. 33:4 
 
 
with little guidance from their professional education. 193   These 
types of moral questions are in fact much more prevalent in practice 
than the clear-cut ethical issues.  Lawyers must decide whether to 
grant extensions for filing documents to their adversaries that might 
provide a small but concrete advantage in the legal struggle.  They 
must decide how much unsavory, even if legal, behavior to tolerate 
from clients before ceasing representation.  In their personal lives, 
they must decide whether it is more correct to attend their child’s 
baseball playoff game or to attend a critical hearing for an important 
client.  What these moral dilemmas have in common is that the 
ethical rules provide no guidance and most law schools provide no 
education regarding how to manage the moral issues that are central 
to an attorney’s professional identity.  Because these courses are 
regularly assigned only two or three credit hours, there is little time 
to have meaningful discussions on values or morality, which will 
arise out of the myriad of dilemmas that lawyers confront.194  Thus, 
ethics courses “give students little, if any, opportunity to think 
through difficult ethical dilemmas and conflicts, to determine how to 
balance their duty to a client with the duties to our legal system and 
to society, or to evaluate questions of basic moral behavior.”195   
In fact, law schools both explicitly and implicitly encourage 
students to detach personal feelings and morals from legal 
analysis. 196   Law schools explicitly encourage the detachment of 
personal opinions and morals by over-emphasizing the case 
method.197  The case method, as I use the term, is the teaching of 
substantive law and legal analysis through the critical study of 
judicial opinions, usually appellate opinions.198  As discussed, this is 
often through a “Socratic dialogue” where professors test students’ 
knowledge of the cases and analytical abilities through a series of 
questions.199  These questions often require students to critique the 
analytical soundness of the judicial opinion and argue different legal 
193. Crystal, supra note 182, at 1236.  For a lucid discussion of “right vs. 
right” moral dilemmas see BADARACCAO, supra note 191. 
194. Crystal, supra note 182, at 1241. 
195. RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF 
THE AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED 236 (1999). 
196. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 187. 
197. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 110, 113–14 (1993). 
198. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 32, at 207. 
199. Id. at 213. 
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perspectives, regardless of how they believe the case should have 
been decided. 200   This is a valuable enterprise, as analytical 
reasoning is an essential lawyering skill best learned through the case 
method.201  Lawyers must analyze the strengths and weaknesses of 
their client’s case, as well as the opponent’s case, without regard to 
their personal feelings or morals.  The problem is not that law 
schools use the case method of teaching, but that they overuse it to 
the point of essentially excluding other methods.202  The approach is 
the predominant teaching method in the first year, and the pervasive 
method through the remainder of law school, which is why it is 
termed the “signature pedagogy” of law school.203  As a result, law 
students spend much of their law school career detaching their 
personal opinions and morality from legal analysis and, as lawyers, 
continue to apply this mindset as a matter of habit.204 
The case method also implicitly encourages morally blind 
legal analysis.  In the absence of meaningful discussion of the role 
that morals and values can play in legal practice, students receive a 
subverted message that morals and values do not play a role.  This 
observation was made in the latest comprehensive study of law 
school curricula and summarized in the book Educating Lawyers, 
which is commonly referred to as “the Carnegie Report”: 
In law school, students learn from both what is 
said and what is left unsaid.  There is a message in 
what the faculty address, and what they do not.  When 
faculty routinely ignore—or even explicitly rule out 
of bounds—the ethical-social issues embedded in the 
cases under discussion, whether they mean to or not, 
they are teaching students that ethical-social issues 
are not important to the way one ought to think about 
legal practice.205  
The overriding message in law school, both explicitly and 
implicitly, is that morals are not relevant to legal practice, which 
200. Id. 
201. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 187. 
202. Id. at 186. 
203. Id. at 31, 187–88. 
204. KRONMAN, supra note 197, at 114. 
205. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 140. 
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encourages what is known as the “hired gun” approach to 
lawyering.206  The rights and needs of the client are emphasized, and 
the lawyer’s personal morals and ethics are de-emphasized.207   This 
philosophy teaches that, with very few limitations, lawyers must 
zealously represent their clients, regardless of the social or moral 
impact.208  Under this approach, “lawyers must take any action to 
advance the client’s interest, so long as the action does not clearly 
violate a rule of ethics or law.”209  In other words, lawyers are “not 
morally accountable for any actions they take on behalf of clients in 
their professional role.”210   
Yet, one of the salient differences between “job training” and 
“professional education” is professional education’s transformational 
quality that includes the assimilation of core values, which implicate 
personal morals. 211   Several critical evaluations of law school 
curricula performed in recent decades have concluded that the legal 
practice should encompass values such as ethics, justice, fairness, 
integrity, and the public good.  For example, the ABA 
Professionalism Committee studied the “purposes of the profession, 
the character of the practitioner, and supportive characteristics of 
professionalism” and concluded that ethical conduct, integrity, and 
dedication to justice and the public good were among the 
characteristics most important to the profession.212  In addition, the 
MacCrate Report, in looking at both professional skills and values, 
advised that important values that are paramount in legal practice are 
“striving to promote justice, fairness and morality.”213  The Carnegie 
206. Id. at 140–41.  




211. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 32.   
212. David S. Walker, Teaching and Learning Professionalism in the First 
Year with Some Thoughts on the Role of the Dean, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 421, 424–25 
(2009).  It is important to emphasize that personal characteristics such as honesty 
and integrity, and many other non-technical capacities, are highly valued by both 
legal employers and clients.  Neil W. Hamilton, Vera E. Monson & Jerome M. 
Organ, Empirical Evidence that Legal Education Can Foster Student 
Professionalism/Professional Formation to Become an Effective Lawyer, 10 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 11, 12–13 (2012).  
213. Id. at 424. 
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Report, referenced above, reached similar conclusions. 214   The 
Report identified three “apprenticeships” that are part of every 
profession. 215   The first is the intellectual apprenticeship that 
“focuses the student on the knowledge and way of thinking of the 
profession.” 216   In the law, this manifests as the critical and 
analytical thinking, and substantive law and procedure that are 
taught. 217  The second apprenticeship is an introduction to expert 
practices, which is taught by engaging in simulated or actual 
practice. 218   The third apprenticeship addresses the “identity and 
purpose” of the profession, which “introduces students to the 
purposes and attitudes that are guided by the values for which the 
professional community is responsible.” 219   The Carnegie Report 
concluded, and I agree, that law schools provide very little support in 
the third apprenticeship, which encompasses the development of the 
lawyer’s personal morals and values.220  
Therefore, it is not only appropriate but also necessary for 
law schools to create space in their core curricula for preparing law 
students for their individual moral decision-making obligations.  The 
focus of this aspect of legal education should be to provide students 
with an intellectual framework for dealing with moral dilemmas that 
should, in part, provide answers to these dilemmas, but also help 
students to ask the right questions.221  As discussed above, absent a 
discussion of the role morality plays in legal practice, lawyers tend to 
internalize the client-centered approach, which amounts to a 
philosophy of the lawyer as a “hired gun.”222  One way to avoid this 
unwelcome outcome is to introduce students to alternative 
philosophies that are not necessarily correct, but nevertheless, 
214. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 132–33, 187. 
215. Id. at 28. 
216. Id.  
217. Id. 
218. Id.  
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. JOSEPH L BADARACCO, JR., DEFINING MOMENTS: WHEN MANAGERS 
MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN RIGHT AND RIGHT (1997). 
222. See NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE GOOD LAWYER 195 
(2014) (cautioning that when the aim of the lawyer is client autonomy, a lawyer 
will erroneously abdicate responsibility for the harm caused by their actions 
because “[t]he client made [them] do it”). 
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credible.  This gives them permission to develop their own 
philosophy of lawyering, within the framework of the core values of 
the profession, which may, or may not, incorporate other personal 
values.   
Two alternative examples of such different philosophies are 
the “philosophy of morality” and the “philosophy of institutional 
value.”223  A philosophy of morality is one in which “lawyers are 
morally accountable for the actions that they take on behalf of their 
clients and must be prepared to defend the morality of what they 
do.”224  This philosophy does not impose any particular set of values; 
it simply states that a lawyer has accountability above and beyond 
what is minimally required under the professional rules of conduct or 
law.225  The consequence of this approach would be lawyers who 
view their obligations more broadly than merely providing legal 
analysis.226  This would create lawyers who are true counselors, who 
distribute what has been called “deliberative wisdom.” 227  This 
philosophy contemplates giving advice that is not morally blind or 
based only on substantive law.  A different, but equally valid 
philosophy of lawyering is called the “philosophy of institutional 
value[s].”228  This lawyering philosophy provides that “the lawyer 
should take such actions as, considering the relevant circumstances 
of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice.”229  “Justice” 
under this philosophy provides that lawyers should make decisions 
so that the “legal merits” of the case are heard.230   In other words, 
lawyers are responsible for promoting the “substantially just 
outcome.” 231  These are just two examples of many possible role 
identities that lawyers might adopt that view lawyering as having a 
moral dimension. 
It warrants emphasizing that ethics rules permit lawyers to 
consider their own morality in exercising “legal” judgment when 
223. Crystal, supra note 182, at 1242–44. 
224. Id. at 1242. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. MACFARLANE, supra note 27, at 107. 
228. Crystal, supra note 182, at 1241. 
229. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 9 (1998). 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
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counseling clients.232  Model Rule 2.1, in pertinent part, states that 
“[i]n rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law, but also 
to other considerations such as, economic, social and political factors, 
that may be relevant to the situation.”233 Thomas Shaffer recounts an 
excellent example of a lawyer exercising such judgment in his 
co-authored book, Lawyers, Clients and Moral Responsibility.234  As 
Shaffer tells it, in 1961 he landed his first legal job with a firm that 
represented a large manufacturer who operated segregated factories 
in the southern United States.235  The client asked his firm’s opinion 
regarding what effect, if any, President John F. Kennedy’s recent 
executive order that required that “government contractors integrate 
their work forces,” would have on its facilities in the South.236  After 
conducting the factual investigation and legal research, Schaffer 
informed the partner in charge of the matter that President 
Kennedy’s executive order would not, as a practical matter, affect its 
client’s operations because the company did little business with the 
federal government of the kind the order sought to regulate. 237    
Schaffer sat in on the call that the partner made to the client to 
inform it that it had no legal obligation to integrate its southern 
segregated factories.238  After the partner explained this to the client 
and articulated the supporting legal analysis, the client asked the 
partner, “Well, what do you think we ought to do?”239  The partner 
replied, “Oh, I don’t think there’s much doubt about what you ought 
to do; I think you ought to integrate those factories.”240  By the next 
year, Shaffer reports, the client was “well into the integration of 
those factories.”241  While moral advice is not always necessary or 
232. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2013) (“[A] lawyer 
who believes his . . . moral beliefs will impair representation must allow [a] court 
to determine propriety of withdrawal.”). 
233. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013). 
234. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, 
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 30–31 (2d ed. 2009). 
235. Id. at 31. 
236. Id. 
237. Id.   
238. Id. at 30–31. 
239. Id. at 31. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
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appropriate, wise attorneys know that it is always available to 
them.242 
Those that advocate that law schools should not be 
responsible for students’ moral development base this view on two 
faulty assumptions.  The first of these assumptions is that because 
law students are mostly young adults, their morals are already 
established and resistant to change. 243   The emerging field of 
behavioral ethics, however, suggests that morality is not a character 
trait “consistent across time and situation,” as previously supposed, 
but rather, it is “situational, dynamic and constantly redefined.”244  
Along these lines, there is strong empirical evidence to support the 
view that social norms and culture play a crucial role in both 
developing morals and abiding by them. 245  For example, studies 
show that “we are more motivated to model our behavior after that of 
an in-group member rather than that of an out-group member.”246  
The fact that morals are malleable at any age and that social identity 
and role, like being a “lawyer,” can influence one’s morals, argues 
persuasively for professional moral education.  Education can help to 
create more moral, ethical, and civil students.  For example, a study 
done in 1995 found that teaching legal ethics “in small, highly 
interactive seminars had a strong positive impact on students’ moral 
judgment scores.”247  Importantly, a different study demonstrated—
not surprisingly—that “clarity of moral thinking” correlates 
significantly with ethical conduct. 248   What does not help moral 
development, studies show, is the current way most law schools 
teach legal ethics, in large, rule-based courses.249   
Law schools should also commit to a moral education 
provided by behavioral ethics to develop a more accurate 
understanding of how we make ethical and moral decisions and how 
242. LEVIT & LINDER, supra note 222, at 218 (stating that “[t]he wise lawyer, 
we believe, sees the conversation between lawyer and client as a moral one”). 
243. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 134. 
244. Lisa L. Shu et al., Ethical Discrepancy: Changing Our Attitudes to 
Resolve Moral Dissonance, in BEHAVIORAL BUSINESS ETHICS: SHAPING AN 
EMERGING FIELD 224–25 (D. De Cramer & A.E. Tenbrunsel eds., 2011). 
245. HAIDT, supra note 140, at 112–13. 
246. Id. at 9. 
247. Id. 
248. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 134. 
249. Id. 
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those decisions so often go wrong.  Behavioral ethics is helping to 
explain the psychological processes that cause us to “behav[e] 
contrary to our best intentions.”250  These psychological processes 
not only prevent us from recognizing ethical issues when they arise, 
but also prevent us from learning from our mistakes. 251   These 
processes include incrementalism, cognitive dissonance, and ethical 
fading to identify just three common “blind spots” that cause us to 
engage in unethical or immoral behavior. 252   The promise of 
behavioral ethics is that once professionals are aware of these blind 
spots in moral decision-making they can take steps to avoid them.253  
Thus, this emerging science tells us that we must not only teach 
students what the ethical standards are, but also teach them a 
systematic way to “reflect realistically” on their ethical failures so 
they can do better next time.254 
A second faulty, and troubling, assumption upon which the 
anti-moral education viewpoint rests is that there are no normative 
moral principles universal to the legal profession.  Of course there 
250. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS 4 (2011).  
251. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Ethics, 45 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1153 (2013) (explaining behavioral ethics in the lawyering 
context and providing an excellent and accessible survey of this important, 
emerging field of study). 
252. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 135, at 1116–24.  
Incrementalism, as I use the term, refers to the process where a seemingly minor 
ethical violation leads to a willingness to commit more serious ethical violations. 
CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARSONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME) 
33–34 (2007). For instance, a minor ethical violation can start “a process of 
entrapment—action, justification, further action—that increases our intensity and 
commitment, and may end up taking us far from our original intentions or 
principles.”  Id.  Cognitive dissonance is a psychological process that creates a 
mental tension “whenever a person holds two cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, 
opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent.”  Id. at 13.  When people act in 
ways that might be interpreted as inconsistent with their principles, cognitive 
dissonance theory tells us that they will rationalize that behavior to reduce the 
cognitive tension. Id. at 15.  Finally, ethical fading is a psychological process 
whereby a person “does not ‘see’ the moral components of an ethical decision not 
so much because they are morally uneducated, but because psychological 
processes ‘fade’ the ethics from an ethical dilemma.”  Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David 
M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 
SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 224 (2004).  
253. Id. at 1156. 
254. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 250, at 158. 
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are.  And we, as faculty, should imbue students with them by word 
and example.  The Model Rules, Oaths of Office, and our history are 
replete with normative principles that have both ethical and moral 
dimensions.  “Truthfulness,” “conflicts of interests,” and “justice” 
are just three of the core normative principles that have as much to 
do with morals as they do with ethics.255  Moreover, professional 
education is as much about who a person is as it is about what a 
person does.256  Law schools have a responsibility to shape the mind 
and the student in the same way that a Marine sergeant shapes the 
mind and the soldier (although our methods are hopefully gentler).  
If well executed, both are positive transformational experiences.  
Still, there are dissenters who hold a different view.  For 
example, a view that the Carnegie Report found “prevalent” among 
the law schools its team visited is captured in the following quote 
from a “senior faculty member”: 
‘I want to push students to think by asking them 
“what would you do?” but I avoid asking them “what 
is good?” or “what should you be doing?” or “what 
role should you have?” or “what view should you take 
on this issue?”  I consider them to be adults and 
would prefer them to bring their own values to law 
school than to try to inculcate them with my 
values.’257 
But these are precisely the questions that we ought to be 
asking our students, and not only in legal ethics courses. In some 
255. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility state that  “[a] 
lawyer . . . is . . . an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
pmbl., § 1 (2013).  The California Attorney Oath of Office is typical of such oaths 
when it states: “To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to 
him or her those means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to 
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or 
law.”  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (d) (West 2014).  The MacCrate Report 
found “fundamental values” of the profession that included the following: “striving 
to promote justice, fairness and morality.”  A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. AND PROF. 
DEV.—AN EDUC. CONTINUUM, A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE 
BAR 140–41 (1992). 
256. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 186. 
257. Id. at 135–36. 
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circumstances, our role as faculty will be to help students develop a 
systematic way of a recognizing and addressing moral dilemmas 
when there are no clear normative answers.  A way to accomplish 
this is by guiding them to ask even harder, more important questions 
that might reveal an answer that is right for them:  Who will I 
become by deciding one way or another?  Whom will I hurt by 
deciding one way or another?  What values important to me are at 
stake by deciding one way or another?  In other circumstances, 
however, not only should we help students to ask these probing 
questions, but we should also guide them to the correct normative 
answers when they implicate moral imperatives of our profession.  
Which choice is more honest?  Which choice is more just?  Which 
choice promotes transparency?  If we do not assume responsibility 
for handing down core professional values, we fail our students, and 
deny a long history of moral education that is one of the most 
important patrimonies of our profession.258   
Law schools need to incorporate moral development in their 
core curricula, where law students can grapple with the kind of moral 
issues they will face when they practice.  This education, I believe, 
must begin early in a law school career and continue throughout it if 
we are to graduate lawyers with a well-developed moral sense, as 
well as a well-developed ethical sense.  A positive development in 
direction is that many schools have added “professionalism” courses 
as part of the required first-year curriculum, where students learn 
about, among other things, professional morals, ethics, and other 
good “habits” of lawyering.259  Finally, law schools have a duty to 
impart normative ethical and moral standards that are central to their 
identities as future lawyers and a systematic way for students to 
engage in ethical decision-making.  As we have seen, recent research 
on moral development suggests that adult student morals are 
“dynamic” and can be improved through education. 260  To waste the 
opportunity to produce morally good and ethical attorneys is, itself, a 
moral failing. 
258. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 27–28 (1994). 
259. Schools that have included professionalism as part of their core 
curriculum have either added “professionalism components to existing first year 
courses or they have offered first year students elective opportunities that include 
this kind of instruction.”  Carpenter, supra note 44, at 102.  
260. Id. 
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IV. THE BEAUTIFUL 
Imagination is more important than knowledge.  Knowledge 
is limited.  Imagination encircles the world. 
–Albert Einstein261 
 
The Greeks’ “subjective experience of beauty” generally 
refers to the creation of an aesthetically pleasing environment 
characterized by form, function, and balance.262  In the context of the 
legal profession, incorporating “beauty” could mean structuring the 
profession so that clients find creative and functional solutions to 
their problems in a time- and cost-efficient manner, and lawyers 
could find personal satisfaction in the process.  One might conclude 
that the best lawyers are the ones who are creative problem solvers.  
Creativity is the ability to produce “both a novel response and an 
appropriate, useful, correct or valuable response” to a client’s 
problem.263  The process of creative problem solving in lawyers not 
only enhances client satisfaction, but also produces happier lawyers.  
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow has asked, “Is it possible 
to speak of legal creativity or is the phrase itself an oxymoron?”264  
One finds scant evidence that law might be a creative endeavor when 
one surveys law school curricula.  The over-emphasis in law school 
on critical thinking, analysis, and substantive law leaves little room 
for students to appreciate that the practice of law is also a creative 
pursuit.  These courses rely heavily on “convergent thinking,” which 
is critical thinking that “troubleshoots, fine tunes, selects[,] and 
implements.” 265  Critical thinking is a form of left-brain directed 
thinking, which is “sequential, literal, functional, textual and 
261. George Sylvester Viereck, What Life Means to Einstein, SATURDAY 
EVENING POST, Oct. 26, 1929, at 117, http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/wp-
content/uploads/satevepost/what_life_means_to_einstein.pdf. 
262. See Hamilton, supra note 8, at 43 (discussing the simplistic, calm, and 
orderly style of Greek architecture). 
263. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 119, at 68.  The authors explained, 
“[g]ood lawyers bring more to bear on a problem than legal knowledge and 
lawyering skills.  They bring creativity, common sense, practical wisdom, and the 
most precious of all qualities, good judgment.”  Id. at 3.  
264. Id. at 68.  
265. Id. at 13. 
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analytic.”266  Law school has historically selected for, taught, and 
rewarded this left-brain directed thinking through the Socratic 
method of instruction and through its examinations, including the bar 
exam.   
Nonetheless, truly distinctive lawyers are those who can 
additionally engage in holistic and creative right-brain directed 
thinking.   While creativity relies partly on the more judicial and 
critical functions of the left-brain, it also incorporates the use of the 
right-brain directed thinking in what is known as “divergent 
thinking.” 267   Divergent thinking “conceives” and “envisions.” 268  
Naturally, creative lawyers are those who can create new arguments 
and do not just rely on precedent.  This kind of thinking is in concert 
with ancient Greek rhetorical traditions that some scholars believe 
should be emphasized in legal education.269  Rhetoric, as many of 
the ancient Greeks understood it, was not just a bag of persuasive 
linguistic tricks but rather a way of seeing and engaging in the 
world.270  This humanistic way of seeing and engaging the world 
imparted important “humanistic capabilities” that are desirable, but 
often missing from modern legal practice. 271   Two of these 
capabilities are “ingenuity of finding similarities among seemingly 
different factors” and “the imaginative capacity to create a new 
understanding of reality.”272  Thus, lawyers should have the ability to 
see the law as it should be or as they might wish it to be and not just 
how it is.   
266. DANIEL H. PINK, A WHOLE NEW MIND: WHY RIGHT-BRAINERS WILL 
RULE THE FUTURE 26 (2005). 
267. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 119, at 13–14. 
268. Id. at 13–14. 
269. Francis J. Mootz, Vico, Llewellyn, and the Task of Legal Education, 57 
LOY. L. REV. 135, 155 (2011). 
270. Id.  Iscocrates vision of rhetoric in particular saw rhetoric as “a bias for 
a self-reflective performance of civic excellence.”  EKATERINA HASKINS, LOGOS 
AND POWER IN ISCOCTATES AND ARISTOTLE 134 (2004). 
271. Mootz, supra note 269, at 139.  These ancient rhetorical traditions were 
defended in a famous oration, entitled, “On the Study Methods of Our Time,” 
given by Professor Giambattista Vico at the 1708 University of Naples 
commencement, which is widely considered one of the last and best efforts 
arguing for the value of traditional rhetorical education in the face of the growing 
acceptance of the Cartesian method, which emphasizes “critical” thinking skills 
that form the basis of modern legal education.  Id. at 136–37.  
272. Id. at 139. 
                                                        
786 THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION [Vol. 33:4 
 
 
One of the most famous examples of this creative capability 
can be found in Professor Charles Reich’s Article, The New Property, 
where he envisioned a new way of thinking about the rights citizens 
have in government assistance, concluding that government 
assistance was a new kind of property right.273  This new way of 
looking at government assistance was eventually adopted in 
Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court case that found that welfare 
benefits were a form of property under the U.S. Constitution 
deserving of due process protection.274   This idea seems obvious 
fifty years later, but was revolutionary at the time.  To arrive at new 
and creative solutions, like the ones articulated in The New Property, 
lawyers need to make intuitive leaps, see overarching patterns, and 
connect ideas that are not immediately obvious.275   William James, 
the Harvard University professor who is considered one of the 
fathers of modern psychology, explained the creative process this 
way: 
Instead of thoughts of concrete things patiently 
following one another in a beaten track of habitual 
suggestion, we have the most . . . rarefied abstractions 
and discriminations, the most unheard of combination 
of elements, the subtlest associations of analogy; in a 
word, we seem suddenly introduced into a seething 
cauldron of ideas, where everything is fizzling and 
bobbing about in a state of bewildering activity, 
where partnerships can be joined or loosened in an 
instant, treadmill routine is unknown, and the 
unexpected seems only law.276 
In other words, right-brain directed thinking is not the 
rational, linear kind of thinking that we most often associate with 
“thinking like a lawyer.”  Rather it is a form of cognition that 
“reason[s] holistically, recognize[s] patterns, and interpret[s] 
273. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 787 (1964). 
274. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
275. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 119, at 73–74. 
276. William James, Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment, ATL. 
MONTHLY 456 (Oct. 1880). 
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emotions and nonverbal expressions.”  Lawyers who can think 
creatively are highly valuable to their clients. 
This more creative style of thinking was the way of the 
ancient Greeks as well.  Ms. Hamilton shares her insights on this 
topic: 
The Greek mind was free to think about the world as 
it pleased, to reject all traditional explanations, to 
disregard all the priests taught, to search unhampered 
by any outside authority for the truth.  The Greeks 
had free scope for their scientific genius and they laid 
the foundations of our science to-day.277 
They were a culture of constant questioners and seekers of 
knowledge and truth.  When you combine their undying love of 
knowledge and truth with their passion for freedom, the result was an 
environment that was the ultimate breeding ground for new ideas.  In 
Ancient Greece, unlike other ancient cultures, “[m]en were thinking 
for themselves.”278  In other ancient cultures, the importance of the 
state superseded the importance of individual thought. 279   The 
ancient Greeks, however, were trailblazers in championing 
individual creative thinking, giving rise to a society where “[a]ll 
things are to be examined and called into question.  There are no 
limits set to thought.”280 
While creativity has always been a valuable quality in the 
practice of law, it is going to become even more vital in the 
twenty-first century because of the role of technology in the law.281  
This thesis is underscored by a recent comprehensive IBM survey of 
1,500 chief executive officers across 33 industries, where creativity 
was found to be the most “crucial” factor for success. 282   The 
popular writer Daniel Pink states we are leaving the Information Age 
and entering what he terms the “Conceptual Age,” in which 
creativity, among other things, will take on paramount 
277. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 29. 
278. Id. at 25. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. 
281. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 119, at 3. 
282. Laura Pappano, Learning to Think Outside the Box, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 
2014, at ED8. 
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importance.283  Pink defines the Conceptual Age as one in which 
participants have the “ability to create artistic and emotional beauty, 
to detect patterns and opportunities, to craft a satisfying narrative, 
and to combine seemingly unrelated ideas into a novel invention.”284  
Pink posits that to survive in this new age, industries need to ask 
themselves: “Can a computer do it faster?” or “Can someone 
overseas do it cheaper?”285  If the answer to either question is “yes,” 
the industry is in trouble.286  Unfortunately, in the legal profession, 
we can answer “yes” to both of these questions, largely because of 
developments in technology.  
In law, the future trend is for more and more “disruptive” 
technologies to change the way law is practiced. 287   This is 
consistent with Richard Susskind’s thesis in Tomorrow’s Lawyers 
that the disruptive drivers of change are “more for less,” 
“liberalization” of who can practice law, and “information 
technology.”288  First, technologies are being developed to do the 
work that lawyers previously performed.  One example is the use of 
“predictive coding.”  Formerly, law firms would charge thousands of 
billable hours for lawyers to produce and review documents in 
discovery. 289   Now, predictive coding, which uses computer 
algorithms to search documents for key terms, can perform the same 
task in a fraction of the time and at a fraction of the cost.290  Federal 
courts have sanctioned its use as an “acceptable substitute for manual 
review,” and at least one federal court has mandated its use. 291  
Although still controversial, the use of predictive coding is becoming 
the new standard for large discovery requests, particularly because 
283. PINK, supra note 266, at 48–49. 
284. Id. at 48, 51–52 (adding that the Conceptual Age involves “the ability 
to empathize, to understand the subtleties of human interaction, to find joy in 
oneself, and to elicit it in others, and to stretch beyond the quotation in pursuit of 
purpose and meaning”).  
285. Id. 
286. Id. 
287. SUSSKIND, supra note 24, at 13. 
288. Id. at 3–14. 
289. Tonia Hap Murphy, Mandating Use of Predictive Coding in Electronic 
Discovery: An Ill-Advised Judicial Intrusion, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 609, 611 (2013). 
290. Id. at 619. 
291. Id. at 612; see also William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 
PEPP. L. REV. 461, 487–88 (2013). 
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the federal discovery rule mandates that courts secure the “just, 
speedy[,] and inexpensive determination of lawsuits.”292  
Greater technology makes creativity an important element in 
creating new ways to practice law more efficiently and provide new 
services.  Again, quoting Susskind, “the challenge is to innovate, to 
practise law in ways that we could not have done in the past.”293  
This means that lawyers with an intimate knowledge of the law and 
legal systems will be needed to create software and other technical 
systems to better serve clients.294  Lex Machina, a legal analytics 
company, offers an example of one such system.  Using proprietary 
software, Lex Machina mines intellectual property litigation data 
made available through public and private databases, such as Pacer, 
USPTO, and EDIS, to find “meaningful patterns” that can help 
lawyers and clients make better decisions related to their litigation 
needs.295  In every filed IP case, the software extracts and organizes 
information related to “asserted patents, findings and outcomes, 
including damages award.”296  It also tracks “the players involved, 
including the attorneys, law firms, parties, and judges.”297  With this 
information, Lex Machina is able to offer revolutionary services that 
help lawyers in three ways.  First, lawyers could uncover how certain 
judges and districts ruled on patent cases.298  One could even identify 
how a certain judge ruled on summary judgment motions and “then 
investigate what strategies worked in those cases.” 299   Second, 
lawyers could learn how aggressive particular companies are in 
defending their patents and how successful they are in defending 
them. 300   Third, lawyers could learn how successful various law 
firms are in prosecuting or defending patent litigation.301  These are 
just a few of the services that Lex Machina offers that could 
significantly enhance litigation strategy information.  None of this 
292. Henderson, supra note 291, at 488 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
293. SUSSKIND, supra note 24, at 13. 
294. Id. at 111–12. 
295. What We Do, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/what-we-do (last 
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information could have been possible, or practically accessible, 
without the technological advancements in data storage and mining 
and the creativity and ingenuity of the lawyers who developed it.   
In addition, technology facilitates legal research and 
communications such that more and more legal work is being 
assigned to offices overseas, where trained employees perform the 
work more cheaply than domestic lawyers.  Organizations and the 
law firms that work for them also have accepted the economic logic 
of outsourcing as they increasingly use English-speaking, 
common-law-trained attorneys in other countries to cut legal 
expenses.302  Although outsourcing legal work is still controversial 
and on a relatively small scale, it is a rapidly growing, cost-saving 
practice.303   
This practice should cause lawyers and legal educators 
concern—especially in an already tight legal job market.  The 
practice of outsourcing raises particular concerns for those attorneys 
who are merely good legal analysts and technicians because, as we 
will see, those are the traits that are more easily outsourced.304  It is 
much harder to outsource attorneys who are valued equally for their 
technical skills as they are for their creative and problem-solving 
skills, the latter two being to a greater extent culture-specific.  
The presently small but growing trend of outsourcing legal 
work shows every sign of having a significant effect on the 
American legal marketplace.  In the next few years organizations are 
302. See Alexandra Hanson, Comment, Legal Process Outsourcing to India: 
So Hot Right Now!, 62 SMU L. REV. 1889, 1895 (2009) (listing law firms that 
represent Fortune 1000 companies and the companies themselves as clients of an 
Indian company offering document review and other legal services); Carlo 
D’Angelo, Overseas Legal Outsourcing and the American Legal Profession: 
Friend or “Flattener?”, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 167, 172–73 (2008) (“[L]aw 
schools in India and the Philippines teach an English-language based curriculum 
that is rooted in English common law principles . . . [therefore,] it is easy to see 
why law firms will be tempted to increasingly outsource legal work overseas.”). 
303. See Hanson, supra note 302, at 1891–92 (noting that while India has 
become the outsourcing destination for U.S. projects, critics of the practice point to 
difficulties created by cultural differences, excessive distance, inadequate data 
protection, and perceived “widespread” corruption). 
304. Jose A. Arambulo, O Where, O Where Has My Legal Job Gone?: 
Examining the Realities of “Offshoring” Legal Work and Why States Can 
Regulate the Practice Despite Congress’ Broad Power Under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause, 38 SW. L. REV. 195, 202 (2008). 
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expected to more than double the amount of legal work they send 
overseas to countries like India and the Philippines, increasing from 
around 35,000 jobs in 2010 to 79,000 jobs in 2015.305  By 2015, 
some forecast that revenue from U.S. offshore legal services in India 
will increase to four billion dollars.306   While researchers disagree 
on what percentage of legal work realistically can be outsourced, 
most agree that the percentage of legal work done offshore will 
increase, perhaps significantly.307   
As organizations become more comfortable outsourcing legal 
work, the sophistication of the outsourced work is also increasing.308  
While the outsourcing of labor-intensive tasks, such as document 
review, has historically generated savings, all types of legal work are 
being done by foreign attorneys for U.S. consumption. 309   Legal 
work that is presently being done offshore includes “legal research; 
drafting contracts and litigation documents, including divorce 
papers; drafting memoranda and briefs; drafting real estate 
documents; and patent, trademark, and copyright work.”310  In terms 
of quality of work, David Perla, co-founder of Pangea3, one of 
India’s largest providers of legal process outsourcing (LPO), boasts 
that he can hire the “best and brightest young lawyers in India” to do 
document reviews, while American contract attorneys hired to do the 
same task in America “have minimal skills and zero motivation.”311  
Another India-based LPO, Lexadigm, has boasted that it “drafted its 
first brief for a U.S. Supreme Court case, involving the application to 
a tax dispute of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.”312  
Although the percentage of legal work presently being 
outsourced still represents only a small fraction of the U.S. legal 
services economy, there is considerable incentive for growth.313 The 
305. D’Angelo, supra note 302, at 174. 
306. Hanson, supra note 302, at 1893. 
307. Arambulo, supra note 304, at 200. 
308. Id. at 201. 
309. Hanson, supra note 302, at 1893. 
310. Arambulo, supra note 304, at 202. 
311. Hanson, supra note 302, at 1895. 
312. Daniel Brook, Made in India: Are Your Lawyers in New York or New 
Delhi?, LEGAL AFFAIRS (May/June 2005), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-
June-2005/scene_brook_mayjun05.msp. 
313. The U.S. legal services market was valued at approximately $160 
billion.  See Arambulo, supra note 304, at 199 (noting that only 2–3% of legal 
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average Indian lawyer’s compensation is significantly less than his 
American counterpart.  While difficult to get exact figures, reports 
are that most Indian lawyers made less than $10,000 a year in 
2008. 314   The median salary in 2008 for an American attorney 
working in a small firm of 11–25 attorneys was approximately 
$65,000.315  Even at the most elite Indian law firms where salaries 
have doubled in recent years because of growing demand, legal work 
can be done much more inexpensively than at most American law 
firms.316  With bonuses, an Indian lawyer at an elite firm could make 
about $30,000 in 2011—still about half of what the median 
American starting salary was during that approximate time frame.317  
The costs become even more disparate when comparing an average 
Indian law salary, and even an elite Indian law firm salary, to the 
$160,000 salary of a starting associate at a major New York law 
firm.318  As organizations increase efforts to reduce legal expenses 
and law firms increase efforts to maintain services while 
simultaneously decreasing overhead, offshoring legal work presents 
an attractive option. 319 
To the extent that lawyers and legal educators continue to 
focus on improving legal analytical and technical skills to the near 
exclusion of other important professional skills like creativity and 
problem solving, American attorneys will be increasingly 
services have been outsourced, but business considerations, such as cutting costs 
and increasing time efficiency, may motivate growth in outsourcing legal services). 
314. Anthony Lin, Legal Outsourcing in India Is Growing but Still 
Confronts Fundamental Issues, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 28, 2008). 
315. What Do Lawyers Earn?  A 15 Year Perspective 1994–2008, NALP 
(Aug. 2009), http://www.nalp.org/aug09newlawyersal. 
316. Kian Ganz, Indian Graduates See Salaries Double, THE LAW., Dec. 5, 
2011, http://www.thelawyer.com/indian-graduates-see-salaries-double/1010532.art
icle. 
317. Id.  In 2011, the median starting salary for American lawyers was 
$60,000 and the median firm salary was $85,000.  Median Private Practice 
Starting Salaries for the Class of 2011 Plunge as Private Practice Jobs Continue 
to Erode, NALP (July 12, 2012), http://www.nalp.org/classof2011_salpressrel. 
318. Hanson, supra note 302, at 1893. 
319. The American Bar Association has held that there is “‘nothing 
unethical about a lawyer outsourcing legal and nonlegal services’” as long as the 
legal work performed is done with the “‘legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for representation.’”  Hanson, supra note 302, at 
1896–97. 
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disadvantaged in the growing and flattening global legal services 
market.  The skills of researching and writing briefs, for example, are 
comparable in most English-speaking, common-law-based societies.  
Thus, these skills can be more easily outsourced to foreign firms.  As 
one commentator states, “[i]f young lawyers continue to graduate 
from law school with only back-office skills, then the consequence 
will be either a decrease in the starting salaries for newly hired 
lawyers or a drastic decline in the number of available job 
offerings.”320  While lawyers proficient in problem solving will not 
be immune from the effects of outsourcing, they will be able to 
provide a service not easily outsourced.  Unlike legal technical skills, 
creative problem-solving skills and interpersonal conflict 
management skills are culture-specific.321  The ways one deals with 
a dispute in India are different from the way one deals with similar 
disputes in the U.S.322  While intercultural dispute resolution skills 
can be learned, they are not as easily transferable as technical 
skills.323  Thus, creating conflict-competent lawyers not only benefits 
the client, but it also benefits the lawyers by making them more 
competitive in the marketplace.  
If lawyers are to produce consistently creative solutions for 
their clients, it is incumbent on law schools to train law students to 
engage in this type of intellectual activity.  Law schools can do a 
better job of cultivating a whole-brain lawyer who can engage in 
divergent thinking, as well as convergent thinking.  Law schools 
need to recognize that creative thinking is as valued a competency as 
evaluation and critical thinking.  In addition to the fact that the 
marketplace places greater value on creativity, other academic 
320. D’Angelo, supra note 302, at 192. 
321. See Catherine H. Tinsely, Culture and Conflict: Enlarging Our Dispute 
Resolution Framework, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 193 
(Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004) (noting that culture affects how 
individuals view conflicts because “[c]ulture is the set of solutions that a society 
has evolved to deal with the regular problems that face it” and since “societies face 
different environments, it is reasonable to expect they will develop different 
cultural characteristics”).  
322. See JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY 9 (2001) (discussing 
the perceived differences between Western and Eastern cultures in negotiations). 
323. See id. at 22 (noting the importance of building relationships because 
intercultural “[n]egotiations are not just about economic outcomes but also about 
relational outcomes”). 
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disciplines recognized long ago the growing importance that 
creativity plays in the new economy.  Bloom’s taxonomy of learning 
objectives nearly 20 years ago replaced “evaluating” with “creating” 
as its most important competency.324  Programs like moot court and 
trial advocacy do give students experience with creativity in 
formulating arguments; but by necessity, the legal problems in such 
programs often have a predetermined universe of arguments and 
counter-arguments so that the exercises are easily subject to 
objective grading and critique.325  Clinics offer more opportunities 
for students to be creative, but most law schools do not require 
students to participate in a clinic and, for those that do, the 
experience is typically limited to a small number of credit hours.326  
Moreover, clinics have limited control over whether the matters that 
they handle are routine or would benefit from a creative solution. 
By requiring courses that emphasize creativity in addition to 
other legal skills, law schools can cultivate students’ divergent 
thinking abilities while heightening awareness of the role that 
creativity will play in their practice.  Harvard Law School recently 
introduced such a course, a “Problem Solving Workshop,” into its 
first-year curriculum.327  The course uses simulations to introduce 
students to legal problem solving by having students confront client 
problems “before the client’s goals are clarified, before the full range 
of options is explored, and before a course of conduct is chosen.”328  
The ability to tackle problems at the start and in realistic settings 
permits students to use their creative problem-solving skills, as well 
as their legal and analytical skills.  The course specifically addresses 
questions like: “What sort of problems do lawyers solve?  How do 
they solve them?  What intellectual construct do they bring to bear?  
What practical judgments?”329  Other schools have recognized the 
324. Pappano, supra note 282. 
325. See Michael Guanantonio, The Practical Use of the Trial Advocacy 
Course in Today’s Legal Education Curriculum, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 485, 498 (2012) 
(comparing the skills tested by a traditional three-hour exam to those tested in a 
trial advocacy class). 
326. Carpenter, supra note 44, at 67.  
327. Problem Solving Workshop, HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law. 
harvard.edu/academics/registrar/winter-term/problem-solving-workshop.html (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
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wisdom in emphasizing the role that creative problem solving plays 
in the practice of law and have begun to introduce similar courses in 
their first-year curricula.330 
There are also a variety of courses perhaps better suited for 
the upper-division curriculum that could boost law students’ 
creativity.  One such course is Designing Legal Expert Systems, 
offered at Georgetown Law Center, which teaches law students how 
to create computer programs to solve real legal issues.  More 
specifically, legal expert systems are computer applications (“apps”) 
that “replicate the thought processes and actions of a lawyer in 
connection with a specific legal question.”331  Because they are run 
on a computer program, they “permit the rapid execution of complex 
logic and the generation of high quality documents tailored to a 
user’s specific circumstances.” 332   What makes this course 
particularly valuable to students is that they are developing apps for 
real clients with real needs.  For example, a group of students created 
an app for the California Foreclosure Advisor, a non-profit 
organization that provides informational resources for consumers 
concerned about banks foreclosing on their homes.  The app, which 
takes only a few minutes to use and is available on the organization’s 
website, takes the consumers through a series of questions and then 
produces a detailed home foreclosure report that explains to the 
consumers their “rights and options, provides guidance on what to 
expect, and highlights resources for further assistance.”333  The value 
of such a course cannot be overstated.  To create such apps, students 
must interface with clients, understand their clients’ needs, 
understand the substantive law, and perform complicated legal 
analysis.  But, most of all, they must use their creative 
problem-solving skills to create something original, functional, and 
valuable.  The one thing that neither they, nor the instructor, need to 
know for this course is how to write computer code because all of 
the apps are written using software that does not require 
330. Elizabeth Moroney, Suffolk Law Launches Problem Solving Workshop, 
HARV. L. SCH., http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/hlscasestudies/2013/06/25/ 
suffolk-law-launches-problem-solving-workshop/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
331. Legal Expert Systems in the Classroom, GEO. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/legal-profession/lega
l-technologies/legal-expert-systems/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
332. Id. 
333. Id. 
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programming knowledge. 334   These are just two examples of an 
array of possible courses that provide students a structured setting to 
flex their creative muscles and build skills that will distinguish them 
as lawyers. 
If you ever have the desire to be inspired, entertained, and 
educated all at the same time, spend twenty minutes watching Sir 
Ken Robinson’s 2006 Ted Talk on the topic of creativity, which has, 
at this writing, the well-deserved distinction of being the most 
viewed Ted Talk ever.335  In his talk, Robinson, an education expert, 
discusses how our primary and secondary educational systems are 
failing our children, and consequently our society, by over-valuing 
critical and logical thinking skills and undervaluing creative thinking 
skills.336  Like Pink and Susskind, he believes that the new century 
will need creative thinkers more than ever.337  Moreover, Robinson 
believes that “we don’t grow into creativity, we grow out of it [and 
o]ften we are educated out of it.”338  What Robinson believes about 
primary and secondary education, I believe about most law schools 
in our current system.   Students that enter with little creativity leave 
that way, and students that enter with well-developed creativity 
frequently leave with those abilities diminished.  Law schools should 
place greater emphasis on teaching creativity because of the 
prominent role it will play in the professional lives of lawyers in the 
twenty-first century.    
334. The course uses the company Neota Logic that “provides an authoring 
interface to build the system without programming knowledge.”  Id.  You can find 
more information about Neota Logic at http://www.neotalogic.com.  You can find 
information about the Georgetown course at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/acad 
emics/centers-institutes/legal-profession/legal-technologies/legal-expert-systems/. 
335. As of this writing, Sir Ken Robinson’s 2006 Ted Talk has been viewed 
26,656,999 times. See Sir Ken Robinson, How Schools Kill Creativity, TED TALK 
(June 2006), http://www.ted.com/talks/ken_robinson_says_schools_kill_creativity.
html. 
336. Id.  
337. KEN ROBINSON ET AL., OUT OF OUR MINDS 2 (2001). 
338. Id. at 50. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
[Y]ou are better and more completely educated . . . because 
you have seen the truth of things beautiful and just and good.   
–Plato339 
 
I have looked to the wisdom of Ancient Greece, a cluster of 
city-states that existed long ago for a short time, for guidance on how 
modern law schools can better prepare litigators for the challenges 
and opportunities they will encounter in twenty-first century legal 
practice. Our intellectual journey back to Ancient Greece suggests 
that law schools can help their students meet the modern challenges 
in legal practice by including more of “the true, the good and the 
beautiful” in the form of collaborative advocacy, professional moral 
development, and creativity in their core curricula.  In Tomorrow’s 
Lawyers, Susskind observes that most law schools are still clinging 
to a twentieth-century legal educational model (substantially similar 
to a nineteenth-century legal educational model) that seeks to create 
“face-to-face, consultative advisors who specialize in black-letter 
law of individual jurisdictions and charge by the hour.”340  Susskind 
concludes, and I agree, that this “traditional” law practice is rapidly 
becoming less relevant because of a need for greater 
cost-effectiveness in a new global economy, liberalization of laws 
governing who can provide legal services, and, most of all, emerging 
technologies that are transforming legal practice. 341  Law schools 
have done a remarkable job in the last century in attaining academic 
credibility, which was one of Dean Langdell’s goals in introducing 
the Socratic method to legal education. 342  If law schools are to 
maintain their status as highly regarded academic institutions, 
however, they must follow Dean Langdell’s example of reforming 
legal education in ways that respond to the needs of the current and 
future generations of lawyers whose clients will expect of them a 
339 . PLATO, REPUBLIC ¶ 520, at 172 (G.M.A Grube trans., 1971). 
340. SUSSKIND, supra note 24, at 135–36. 
341. Id. at 136.  Susskind says that we should be trying to produce future 
generations of lawyers “to be more flexible, team-based, hybrid professionals, who 
are able to transcend legal boundaries, speak the language of the boardroom, and 
are motivated to draw on techniques of modern management and information 
technology.”  Id. 
342. Rubin, supra note 5, at 612–13. 
                                                        
798 THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION [Vol. 33:4 
 
 
broader definition of what it means to be an “advocate” than the one 
most law schools have previously contemplated. Embracing an 
expansive definition of advocacy will not only make happier clients, 
but also make happier lawyers.  The ancient Greeks defined 
happiness as the “exercise of vital powers along lines of excellence 
in a life affording them scope.”343  I believe that expanding the core 
content of the law school curriculum in the ways expressed in this 
Article will produce lawyers who will better serve their clients and 
better appreciate the wide-ranging challenges and opportunities that 
a life in the law affords them for the exercise of their “vital powers.” 
343. HAMILTON, supra note 8, at 24. 
                                                        
